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1.  RESEARCH  PROJECT 
l.l  Introduction 
The  effects of new  information technology upon  work  and  society has 
attracted considerable coverage both in the media  and  in the  forums 
of public debate.  This  coverage reflects a  wider  concern with the 
ability of Western nations  to adapt to changing economic  circum-
stances without serious social dislocation.  In a  period of rising 
unemployment  technological progress appears  simultaneously as an 
opportunity and  a  threat.  Aspirations and  fears are 
heightened by  the major characteristics of information technology -
the rapidity of change it presages  and  its ubiquitous nature.  This 
research project was  not designed to  indulge in  'fUturology'  but to 
examine  one  particular aspect of the new  technology-its known  impact 
upon  industrial relations procedures  and practices.  The  study seeks 
to analyse actual  changes  in industrial relations arising from  the 
advent of information  technology in two  countries - the United 
Kingdom  and  the Federal  Republic of Germany  - and  the potential 
changes  which  may  be  extrapolated from  that analysis. 
The  comparative  study of industrial relations does not appear as 
exciting as  prophesying the shape of society in the year 2001,  but 
it is nonetheless a  subject worthy  of attention.  The  way  in which 
information technology is introduced and  handled at work  will play a 
significant role  in determining  the pace,  process and  nature of 
change  for society in general.  The  world  we  live in is,  for better 
or worse,  largely the product of human  decisions and  the workplace 
remains  an  important variable  in most  decision-making processes. 
The  impact of  information technology  upon  industrial relations might 
signify only  another round  in  the perennial struggle between  man  and 
machine,  but that struggle has  in the past been witness  to many  a 
pitched battle and  battles which  can be  avoided are battles won. 
This  study does  not provide answers  to the questions of acceptance 
or rejection of technological  change  or adaption to it.  These  are 
matters for better brains or a  more  efficient crystal ball.  What 
the  study does  is to examine  the perceivable  impact of information 
technology upon  industrial relations in certain economic  sectors to 
date  (a very early date it must  be  said}  and  to explore the apparent 
and  likely consequences  of that impact.  It is an  examination of the 
eyidence  from  which,  it is hoped,  future building blocks might be 
constructed;  although it is more  analogous  to an  inspection of the 
site's drainage  than  the  laying of firm  foundations.  However,  it is 
always  prudent to  know  something of the state of the soil before 
building commences. 
1.2  The  new  technology debate 
It -is  argued that technology always  advances,  never retreats.  A 
clear historical case can be  made  for  the veracity of the statement 
and,  short of the nuclear holocaust,  its continuance as a  truism. 
Nevertheless  the  pace of change  is probably  more  important than the 
mere  fact of change.  It took a  long  time  from  the Samarian 
invention of the  wheel  to  the mass  production of automobiles. 
Twentieth century  man  has been  witness to a  pace of change  unknown 
to his predecessors.  Information  technology  promises  a  pace of un-
parallelled rapidity.  Those  subject to change  are necessarily 
fearful of the  displacement and  dislocation to be  caused. -2-
In societies where  the Protestant Ethic predominates,  and  where  work 
remains  the  major  source of income  and  status,  the fear of job loss 
and  the actuality of unemployment  can prove powerful  determinants of 
attitudes and  behaviour.  Joe Hill's preacher promised  "pie in the 
sky",  to be  eaten  "bye  and bye".  Evidence  would  suggest that late 
twentieth century man  (and  woman)  takes  a  more  agnostic view  towards 
earthly rewards. 
The  inter-face between technological  change  and  the human  response 
provides  the  fulcrum of the  industrial relations debate.  The  impact 
of"technological change  upon  industrial relations is not predictable 
and  nor is it likely to be  uniform,  but it is a  significant factor. 
Whether  information  technology is pushing the heavy stone  of 
industrial relations uphill or downhill still remains  to be  seen. 
The  debate  in most  Western societies is in its early stages.  Common 
themes  have  emerged but beyond  the absence of panaceas collective 
agreement  is hard  to find.  The  state and  level of disagreement, 
however,  is central  to the argument  and  to this study. 
Technological  advancement  has  traditionally been  welcomed  by 
organized labour.  Trade unions post-date Luddism  and,  whilst 
remaining primarily defensive organisations,  they have  sought to 
control  technology  and  its benefits in  the interests of  their 
membership  rather than seeking to prevent change.  Where  trade 
unions  have  placed obstacles in the  way  of technological  change, 
they  have  invariably done  so  to  influence that change not to oppose 
it.  Certainly in  the post-war period the  trade union movements  in 
the  two  countries under  study - Britain and  West  Germany  - have 
consistantly linked their political demands  with general  economic 
growth  and  have  stood in the  forefront of those  seeking greater 
public  and private investment in industry.  Technology  and  capital 
expenditure have  been viewed as essential weapons  in the fight for 
economic  development,  growch  and  better living standards.  If 
Britain's advance  in "the white-hot heat of the technological 
revolution" did not quite match  that of the German  "economic 
miracle",  then this was  not  a  consequence of differing attitudes to 
technological  change  by their respective trade union movements 
(whether it can  be  at all attributed to differing trade union 
practices is a  more  contentious  issue).  It is important to note at 
the outset that almost  the entire post-war generation of trade union 
leaders  in both Britain and West  GermAny  have  viewed  technological 
advancement  not only as  necessary but as  fundamental  to both the 
short and  long-term interests of their members. 
New  information  technology has given  trade unions  food  for  thought. 
Its application at a  time  of high unemployment  and  deep  recession in 
the  Western  economies  has  seen  the  caution  c~stomary of organised 
labour supplemented by  a  heightened level of concern.  This  concern 
has  not  changed  the  post-war consensus  on  the desirability of 
technological  advancement,  but it has  posed new  questions as  to  the 
pace of change  and  the  end-product of change.  In  so  doing the 
industrial relations'  framework,  which  seeks to handle  change,  has 
also been called into question.  The  way  in which  changing attitudes 
are reflected in negotiations,  bargaining and  agreements are central 
to this study.  Questions of particular concern will  be  new  elements 
in bargaining,  and  in  'productivity bargaining',  and  their 
implications for  industrial relations. -3-
Although it is a  generalisation,  trade union attitudes to 
information technology at present may  be  likened to a  patient being 
prescribed a  painful  course of treatment for an  illness;  there is a 
belief that the final result will prove beneficial but the medieine 
to be  taken,  and  the uncertain length of the prescription,  are 
viewed  with some  trepidation.  It is against such a  background that 
the  research was  undertaken and within  that context that the 
findings  must  be  appraised.  Industrial relations can be  viewed  as  a 
product of past practice,  present experience and perceptions of the 
future.  Past practice depends  on  the  length and quality of memory, 
whilst present experience  and  future perceptions are constantly 
chahging.  The  new  technology  debate  is an ongoing one.  Experiences 
and  perceptions are  mixed.  These  preliminary remarks on  the nature 
of the past and  present debate seek to outline,  and  underline,  the 
uncertainty which  surrounds it.  The  study seeks to cast light on  a 
subject which  is both fluid and  potentially volatile. 
1.3  Research objectives 
The  study started from  broad terms of reference  - to examine  the 
impact  on  industrial relations of  'new  information technologies'  in 
specific sectors of the British and  West  German  economies.  The 
terms of reference were  expressed by means  of five  major objectives: 
1/  To  provide data regarding  formal  and  informal,  theoretical 
and actual,  procedures  for  introducing and handling 
technological change  and  their impact  on  industrial 
relations at both an  organisational and national  level,  and 
to assess  the effectiveness of industrial relations 
procedures  in handling new  technology  issues. 
2/  To  examine  attitudes towards  technological  change  from  the 
point of view of those  introducing it 
(organisation/management),  those negotiating its 
introduction  (trade unions)  and  those directly  involved  in 
handling it (employees). 
3/  To  analyse  the bearing of organisational structures and 
collective agreements  on  the capacity of managers  to 
generate methods  and  mechanisms  for  the  introduction and 
control of new  technology,  and  to study the  development  of 
trade union strategies towards  new  technology. 
4/  To  study the  impact of technological  changes upon  the 
internal processes and  dynamics  of the 
organisation/enterprise concerned,  with particular emphasis 
being placed on  work  organisation,  disclosure of 
information,  employee  participation and manpower  planning. 
5/  To  provide a  more  accurate  and  coherent knowledge  base  in 
regard to  the  impact of new  technology on  industrial 
relations'  procedures  and  systems  in order  to guide 
decisions  taken  by  policy-makers  and  industrial relations 
practitioners.  To  do  this by  the provision of cross-
national  data from  two  countries with different industrial 
relations•  frameworks:  West  Germany  - 'legalistic'  and 
Britain- •voluntaristic'. -4-
To  fully meet  the  requirements of these objectives would  have 
required a  much  longer and  more  detailed study  than  time  and 
resources  allowed.  However,  the  study does  claim to cast some  light 
on  all the areas under  examination but it is limited both by  its 
sectoral approach  and  the  range  of its enquiries. 
1.4  Research  sectors and  study  refinement 
The  research study proposed examining  the  impact of information 
technology in three economic  sectors - engineering,  office work  and 
te~ecommunications.  The  sectors  were  left deliberately broad and it 
was  intended that a  mix  of blue-collar/white-collar,  skilled/semi-
skilled,  and  male/female occupations would  be  embraced.  Time  and 
the  requirements of case  study  work  demanded  a  sharper focus  and  the 
three sectors were  modified  to read  : 
1.  Office  work  - with particular reference  to word  processors 
{WPs) 
2.  Communications  - with particular reference  to  the  banking 
sector 
3.  Manufacturing - with particular reference  to  design and 
development,  computer aided design  (CAD)  and  computer aided 
manufacture  (CAM);  and  new  machinery,  numerical  control  (NC) 
and  computer numerical  control  (CNC)  machines. 
Although  the  focus  of the study was  narrowed,  it was  deliberately 
not narrowed  to  the  point of examining specific technologies in 
particular industries and  concerns e.g.  automatic telling in 
banking,  word  processors  in  insurance or  computer aided design in 
the aerospace  industry.  The  case studies would  possess  such 
limitations but  the  study was  designed  to generate  data of a  more 
widespread  application.  The  emphasis  was  placed on  an  overview of 
industrial relations changes  as  a  result of new  information 
technology  and  the generation of comparative data which  would  be 
relevant both  inside and  outside  the  immediate  study sector.  The 
case studies were  seen  to provide  supportive  evidence  to  the overall 
enquiry. 
1.5  Methodology 
It was  clear that to meet  the objectives of the study a  number  of 
research tools  would  have  to  be  utilised.  Case  studies would  be 
carried out  in all  three sectors but  they  were  to be  illustrative 
analyses rather  than definitive in-depth research studies.  A 
literature survey  was  clearly required and  supplementary evidence 
obtained  from  key  personnel  both  inside and  outside the research 
sectors - managers,  trade union representatives,  government experts, 
academics  etc.  The  comparative  element  was  vital and  the  following 
joint methodology  was  agreed  : 
1.5.1  Literature survey  - to be  linked and  inter-woven with  the 
primary data rather  than  forming  a  separate entity.  {A 






Case  studies - a  m1n1mum  of one  case study in each of the. 
three sectors.  The  case studies to be  viewed  as 
illustrative rather  than  typical  and  compared  and contrasted 
with  the  findings  from  other studies and  further detailed 
primary  and  secondary research. 
The  case studies to be  based on  semi-structured interviews 
with managers,  supervisors,  technicians,  trade union 
representatives and,  where  possible,  employees  in  the 
companies/organisations concerned. 
The  semi-structured interview schedule utilised is 
reproduced in  the  Appendix  and  the  main  areas of enquiry can 
be  listed as  follows  : 
1.  the  introduction of new  information technology 
2.  the process of change  - information,  communications, 
consultation,  involvement  and participation 
3.  procedures  ru1d  agreements 
4.  new  technology bargaining and the handling of change 
5.  operation,  supervision and  control 
6.  work  organisation 
7.  manpower  planning and  industrial relations 
8.  industrial relations'  frameworks  and systems. 
Key  personnel  interviews  - to be  carried out with  a  wide 
range of representatives  from  both sides of industry, 
government  and  government agencies,  academics,  experts and 
other interested parties.  Interviews  to be  both  formal  and 
informal.  Formal  interviews  to utilise a  similar format  as 
that adopted  in  the  individual  case studies. 
Confidentiality - it was  considered  important to the  nature 
of the enquiries and  study that total confidentiality should 
be  provided  in .order  that full  and  frank  opinions  and 
discussions  could take place.  All  individuals,  companies 
and  organisations associated with  the  case studies  and key 
interviews  have  been  kept  anonymous  (even  though  in certain 
cases this was  neither required or requested). 
Hypotheses  - it was  debated whether certain hypotheses ought 
to be  posited and  tested.  A number  of models  - "co-
operative/conflict" and  "positive/protective" being the most 
widely quoted - concerning  technology  and  industrial 
relations have  been  formulated.  Their  inadequacy and 
generality were  such  that both research  teams  eschewed their 
utilisation.  The  nature of this particular study was  felt 
to be  more  conducive  to  the offering of opinions rather than 
the  testing and  exposition of theories. -6-
1.6  Outline of report 
The  report is divided into five  sections:  the first,  this section, 
has outlined the  nature of the subject and  the research study;  the 
second section will briefly examine  the comparative national 
industrial relations'  frameworks  and perspectives on  new  technology; 
tQe  third section will explore information  tecnology at the 
workplace  and  will  summarise  the  findings  from  the  case studies;  the 
fourth  section will  focus  particularly on  trade union response, 
policy and  strategy;  and  the fifth section will  make  a  comparative 
assessment of the  industrial relations implications and  draw 
conclusions  from  the  study. -7-
2.  NATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES 
2.1  Industrial relations'  systems  in Britain and  West  Germany 
The  concept of an  industrial  relations'  "system"  is an  academic  idea 
of relatively recent origin.  It can probably be  traced to the 
Webbs'  (1897)  definition of the relationship  between  employers  and 
trade unions  as  "industrial democracy",  but its development as  a 
concept of academic  discourse  and  analysis is largely a  product of 
the  post-World  War  II period.  It is a  concept not without 
theoretical and practical complexity.  Its validity as  a  tool of 
analysis may  be  open  to question where  more  detailed assessments  are 
required but for broad  comparisons,  with which  this study is 
concerned,  it has  its uses. 
Clegg  (1972)  argued  that industrial relations could be  defined as 
the  study of job-regulation.  The  rules which  regulated jobs could 
be  made  and  adminstered  in  three ways:  employer  regulation, 
collective bargaining .and  statutory regulation.  For most  large 
workforces  in Britain and  West  Germany  the  days  of absolute employer 
regulation are  long gone.  What  we  are left with,  the  network of 
rules which  constitute the output of an  industrial relations system 
(Dunlop  1958),  is a  mixture  of rules defined firstly  by  collective 
bargaining and  agreement  and  secondly  by  state regulation and  state 
intervention.  No  Western nation's system of industrial relations 
can be  defined solely by  means  of one  of these  forms  of regulation -
each has  its own  particular  'mix'.  The  British  'mix'  was 
sufficiently complicated for Donovan  (1968)  to describe it in terms 
of two  industrial relations'  systems -the 'formal'  and  'informal' 
system.  Without  delving  too  deeply  into the  intricacies of British 
industrial relations,  it can be  argued  that  the predominant form  of 
regulation is through  collective bargaining and  that the  system is 
largely  'voluntaristic'.  In  West  Germany  the opposite is the case. 
Collective bargaining exists and  flourishes  but it does  so within a 
framework  of state regulation - regulation which  applies strict 
rules  ti1roughout  the  system.  The  West  German  system  can be 
characterised as  'legalistic'. 
Those  that would  read  too  much  into the  differences  between 
'voluntarism'  and  'legalism'  are  liable to get their theories burned 
along with  their fingers.  However,  that is not to say  that the 
distinction between  the  two  is unimportant or that the differing 
rules  'mix'  do  not  lead  to contrasting practices and  behaviour. 
Some  major points of departure  may  be  noted. 
In Britain there exists a  wide  range  of  barg~ining levels.  The 
predominant  form  of bargaining is single-employer - only 27%  of 
manual  workers  in manufacturing  industry  have  multi-employer 
agreements  (industry-wide and  regional)  as their most  important 
source of wage  increase  (Brown  1981,  p.17).  Industry-wide 
agreements  are  common  but  they usually provide  no  more  than  a 
•·safety net  1  support for  wages.  In West  Germany  the  most  common 
form  of pay  bargaining is regional  industry-wide  agreements. -8-
The  German  system is facilitated by  their regional  (federal) 
political structure and  their system of industrial unionism  (17 
trade unions  in all).  The  British system is based  on  voluntary 
collective agreements,  which  are not legally binding,  and  the 
German  system  on  legally binding contracts.  Step-by-step 
bargaining regulations operate  in West  Germany,  which restrict 
although not entirely remove  recourse  to industrial action.  In 
Britain exhaustive procedures exist,  sometimes  backed up  by 
arbitration,  but  the absence  of legal regulations ensures  a  higher 
breakdown  rate of negotiations and  hence  more  widespread  use of 
industrial action  (as  a  cursory glance at comparative West  German 
and  British strike figures will  show).  These  generalisations 
conceal  a  web  of different bargaining practices but the 
voluntaristic/legalistic dichotomy  remains valid.  In West  Germany 
pay bargaining is regulated by  the legal  framework  of the 
industrial relations'  system,  and it can be  argued that agreements 
are reached which  reflect prevailing national attitudes towards and 
conditions for economic  stability and  growth  (Hotz  1981,  p.389). 
In Britain the perceived and  actual unpredictability of  'free 
collective bargainitlg'  has  led successive governments,  of both 
major political parties,  to pursue  incomes  policies - often 
statutory intervention - to  control  the  economy,  or rather seek to 
control it.  Voluntarism is not necessarily more  flexible  than 
legalism. 
In Britain the  'formal'  system of industrial relations revolves 
around  the state,  employers  and  full-time  trade union officials - a 
network of company,  organisation and  industry-wide institutions 
supports and  constitutes the system.  In  addition,  as Donovan 
correctly observed,  there  is an  'informal'  system based on  lay trade 
union officials - shop  stewards or trade union  representatives -
whose  input into the industrial relations'  system is both  large and 
influential.  Although  both  systems  are based on  largely recognised 
and  approved  trade union channels,  the  'formal'  or  'official'  system 
can clash with  the  'informal'  or  'unofficial'.  The  multiplicity of 
British trade unions  and  the nature of shopfloor bargaining can lead 
to conflict within  the  'informal'  system  which  could not arise in 
West  Germany. 
In West  Germany  there is a  form  of dual  representation at plant 
level but it has  no  comparison  in Britain.  The  duality is caused by 
the legal system of works  councils,  which  by  law have  to represent 
the interests of all employees  although  they are predominantly trade 
union institutions,  and shopfloor trade union representatives.  In 
practice it is the  works  councils  who  make  and  administer works 
agreements  and it is they  who  are responsible for  bargaining at 
shopfloor level  (apart from  pay bargaining).  The  law prevents  them 
from  being a  party to industrial action but in all other non-wage 
matters  they have  considerable powers  of intervention. 
The  characterisation of the West  German  system  as  'legal~stic'  and 
the British system  as  'voluntaristic'  is accurate to a  degree  in 
regard ·to wage  bargaining;  although  incomes  policies,  cash limits 
and public sector pay  'norms'  do  tend to dent  the concept of free 
market  'voluntarism'. -9-
The  distinction between  British shop-floor bargaining,  in which  lay 
shop  stewards  were  influential figures,  and  West  German  regional 
and  industry-wide bargaining,  over which  the  shop-floor had little 
influence,  was  always  a  generalisation.  As  the recession has 
deepened  and  shop-floor bargaining power  been  eroded,  it has become 
even less meaningful.  Briti.sh  'voluntarism'  has  usually operated 
within  a  framework  of state regulation or a  concept of the  'going 
rate'  established by  certain national  settlements:  the concept of 
diffuse,  decentalised pay bargaining has  always  required 
considerable qualification.  Equally  in West  Germany  the 
establishment of industry-wide agreements  has  always  required  their 
practical implementation at company  and  shopfloor levels.  German 
works  councillors are no  less  'bargainers'  than their British 
sho~floor colleagues.  In  terms  of the  introduction of new 
technology it is more  important to stress the similarity of their 
roles than  the apparent differences. 
Where  the  two  systems  can  be  distinguished is in the  area of 
conflict resolution.  The  alegal aspect of British collective 
agreements  and  the  largely voluntary role of arbitration and 
conciliation services,  makes  settlements more  difficult to obtain 
than  in the heavily procedural  German  system.  Recourse  to 
industrial action is an  established bargaining  'tool'  in Britain; 
in West  Germany  it is a  rarity. 
The  legal  framework  and  institutional structures of conflict 
resolution which  are built into  the  German  system,  are  reinforced by 
participation at all levels of the  enterprise.  The  system of "co-
determination",  enshrined in  the Works  Constitution Act,  is a  major 
characteristic of the  German  system of industrial relations.  It 
provides  works  councils  with statutory rights of participation and 
ensures  an  element of workers'  participation at board level;  only 
in coal,  iron  and  steel does  this amount  to  50/50 representation, 
true  'co-determination',  but  in all other industries and 
organisations  the  workforce elect one-third of the  members  of the 
top supervisory board  (there is a  two-tier board structure with a 
lower  management  board).  This statutory right to participation 
exemplifies  the  German  system's  legal  and practical emphasis on  a 
co-operative  approach  to  management  and  industrial relations.  It 
accepts  the  inevitability of conflict but institutionalises it to 
ensure  peaceful  resolution.  The  interests of the  workforce are 
represented throughout.  In Britain workers'  participation has made 
little formal  headway.  Proposals  to extend industrial  democracy  on 
a  national scale  (Bullock 1977)  have  been  mooted  but  the worker 
director remains  a  British industrial relations'  oddity  (steel and 
shipbuilding have  them,  as  did  the  Post Office).  Many  British trade 
unions  have  a  deep-seated distrust of participation,  although a 
major  development  in industrial relations  over  the last decade  has 
been  the rise of "joint consultation" - 77%  of British companies 
with  over 1,000 employees  now  have  some  form  of joint consultation, 
the majority of these  joint consultative committees  (61%)  being 
established since  1972  (Brown  1981,  pp.75-79). -10-
As  the  law  is increasingly  invoked  to settle disputes  and  labour 
legislation multiplies,  the emphasis  on  regulation by collective 
bargaining rather than state intervention is changed  and  the 
description of the  system of job regulation··  as  'voluntaristic  •  as 
opposed to  'legalistic'  becomes  less valid.  However,  for  the 
purposes of this study  the  distinction will  be  made  and  two  key 
elements highlighted as  they  impinge  upon  the  introduction and 
handling of new  technology i.e. firstly,  the German  legal 
participative structure as  opposed  to the British consultative 
framework  and,  secondly,  the different legal status of collective 
agreements  in the  two  countries.  Despite its over-simplification, 
the German  system of industrial relations will  be  termed 
'co-operative'  and  the British system  'adversarial'.  This  is not  to 
construct a  model  of job regulation  in the  two  countries but simply 
to underline  the clear difference of approach. 
2  Boundaries of the  debate 
In the  introductory section  (see 1.2)  observations were  made  on  the 
wider debate.  Describing  the  German  system of industrial relations 
as  'legalistic'  and  'co-operative'  compared  to Britain's 
•voluntaristic'  and  'adversarial'  system,  does  not mean  to  imply 
that national perspectives on  the  subject will  be  governed by  any 
such structural differences.  The  impact of structure upon  practice 
is a  concern of this study but  the wider  debate  operates  above  that 
level  in the realms  of theory.  It is worth  re-emphasising,  before 
the actual practice is studied,  that the  theoretical premises, 
which  could  be said to form  the boundaries of the  debate.  are 
shared.  The  two  countries may  differ in practice and  approach but, 
on  this issue,  assumptions  are  common. 
National  perspectives generally reflect a  widespread  acceptance of 
information  technology  as  being necessary  for  economic  and  social 
progress.  How  this is reflected in  the strategies and  practices of 
the various parties - the state,  employers  and  trade unions  - will 
be  examined  later.  However,  it is important to note  that the  debate 
is confined to  the  manner  of acceptance  and  does  not  juxtapose 
alternative strategies of acceptance or opposition.  The  debate 
revolves  around optimisitic and  pessimistic predictions and  whether 
'efficiency'  or  'employment'  should represent  the  primary objective, 
but it does  not - as far  as  the parties in  the respective  industrial 
relations'  systems  are concerned - involve  any  element of rejection 
of the  technology itself.  The  most  critical party,  the  trade 
unions,  are concerned to debate  the  manner  and  conditions of 
acceptance - there is not  a  "no  new  technology"  strategy.  The 
shared assumptions  of trade unions  in Western  Europe  on  this 
question  (see  ETUI  1979  and  Chamot  and  Dymmel  1981)  are not 
necessarily reflected in shared practice.  The  study will  now  turn 
to examine  some  facets of that practice. (2) 
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INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY  AND  INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  AT  THE  WORKPLACE 
1  Shopfloor industrial relations 
British industrial relations has historically been based upon 
collective bargaining and  agreements  between  employers  and  trade 
unions.  Collective agreements,  apart from  the brief interlude 
afforded by  Ted  Heath's ill-fated Industrial Relations  Act  of 1970 
(rescindeq in 1974),  have  since 1871  been unenforceable  in law.  The 
1906  Trade Disputes  Act  protected trade unions  from  legal actions on 
the grounds of civil conspiracy  and  induced breach of contract as 
long as  their action was  "in contemplation or  furtherance of a 
trade dispute". 
Until the 1970s  legal  intervention in shopfloor  industrial 
relations concerned only matters relating to  the working 
environment  (Factory Acts  and  Office and Shop  Acts),  wages  councils 
(in low-paid  industries)  and  contracts of employment  (the  legal 
relationship between the  individual employee  and  employer). 
Collective agreements  and  'custom and practice'  defined  the role 
and operation of trade unions at shop-floor level.  Economic 
difficulties and perceptions of the  trade union  contribution to 
those  problems  has  resulted in increasing state intervention in 
industrial relations. 
Labour  legislation in the  mid-1970s  {notably the Trade  Union  and 
Labour Relations  Act  and  the  Employment  Protection Act)  firstly 
undid  the  interventionist Industrial Relations  Act  and  secondly 
stipulated basic  individual  and  collective rights at work.  Although 
certain of these rights have  been  amended  by  the  Employment  Act 
(1980),  particularly in regard to picketing and  the closed shop,  and 
certain further legislation is proposed,  the  framework  of individual 
and collective rights enacted  in the  mid-1970s  largely remains.  In 
relation to this subject rights of disclosure of information for 
collective bargaining purposes  and  time-off for  trade union duties 
are particularly relevant. 
~ritish industrial relations at shop-floor level has  become  more 
formalised with  legislative  intervention,  one  result being a  growth 
in disputes procedures  (Brown  1981,  p.44),  but practice remains  far 
more  dependant  upon  agreements based upon  bargaining power  than 
legal rights.  On  a  range of issues - wages,  hours,  humanisation of 
work,  workers'  participation etc.- there is no  legal  'safety net'; 
trade unions get what  they  can bargain.  Thus,  when  it comes  to new 
technology  there is very little legislative support that the trade 
unions at shopfloor level  in Britain can call upon.  This  is, of 
course,  largely a  matter of choice;  trade unions  have  traditionally 
rejected minimum  wages  legislation,  hours  legislation,  overtime 
legislation and  other  legal  interventions,  such  as  on  humanisation 
of work  or industrial democracy  (the latter being a  divided  issue) 
as  they were  seen to encroach upon  the ability of unions to  improve 
their members  lot by  means  of  'free collective bargaining'.  In 
reacting to new  technology,  therefore,  British trade  unions have  had 
to rely on  their traditional weapons  of bargaining skill and  power. -12-
In West  Germany  trade unions  operate within  a  well-defined 
legislative framework.  The  main  plank of this  framework  is the 1952 
Works  Constitution Act  (WCA).  The  WCA  instituted a  national  system 
of works  councils which  have  become  the pivotal point in the  whole 
system of German  industrial relations  (Sturmthal  1964,  pp.53-85). 
Works  councils do  not reach  independent agreements  on  pay  and 
conditions,  which are settled by  regional  industry-wide  agreements 
{legally binding and prohibiting industrial action during  the  course 
of the  agreement),  but  they do  perform many  shop-floor bargaining 
fUnctions.  Their role is not  the  same  as  that of the British shop 
stewards' "committee  as  they  are  legally bound  to pursue  a  policy of 
·trustful co-operation with  the  employer.  However,  their right to 
negotiate piecework rates and  incentive payment  systems,  plus other 
rights and  duties in regard to enforcing collective agreements, 
applying  factory  legislation,  making  plant regulations and  work 
rules,  handling grievances,  operating social welfare services,  and 
regulating recruitment  and  dismissal  procedures,  provides  works 
councils with  considerable authority at shop-floor level.  The  works 
councils are  the main  vehicle of trade union  bargaining power  at 
shopfloor level. 
The  main  distinction to be  made  between  the  two  systems  in respect 
of new  technology is that German  trade unions at plant level have 
had specified legal rights of disclosure of information for  the past 
thirty years,  British trade unions  have  only  recently acquired  (EPA 
1975)  some  form  of legal obligation on  the  part of employers  to 
disclose  information for bargaining purposes.  In West  Germany  the 
WCA  stipulates that the employer  must give  the  works  council 
sufficient notice about  the planning: 
"1.  of the building of  (or alterations or extensions to) 
manufacturing,  administrative and  other premises 
2. of technical plant equipment 
3.  of work  methods  or processes 
4.  of jobs. 
The  employer is also obliged to consult with  the  works  council 
over  the possible effects of the  above  on  the  employees'  jobs. 
Both  the  employer  and  the works  council  should at the  same  time 
pay  regard to the body  of scientific knowledge  that exists with 
reference to the humanisation of work."  (WCA  Section 90) 
The  1975 Employment  Protection Act  in Britain did not go  so far  as 
to provide statutory rights of a  comparable nature.  Under  the  EPA 
an  employer is obliged to disclose certain  information for 
collective bargaining purposes but the  Act  does  not specify whether 
a  trade union has  a  right to  information regarding management's 
future  plans.  Thus  the questions of investment,  new  products,  work 
organisation and  manpower  planning,  all crucial  to the  introduction 
of new  technology,  are not covered by  the  EPA.  The  ACAS  Code  of 
Practice  (ACAS  - 2  - 1977)  designed  to clarify the  Act  does  mention 
"planned changes  in work  methods,  materials,  equipment or 
organisation;  available manpower  plans;  investment plans",  but it 
does  so in extremely ambiguous  terms  - "examples  of information re-
lating to the undertaking which  could be  relevant in certain 
collective bargaining  situations~3- author's emphasis). -13-
At  shop-floor level  the  German  system provides certain statutory 
rights and  responsibilities and  places  them  in the hands  of the 
employer and  works  council.  In  addition it provides  information and 
consultation rights  in  regard to  changing work  methods  and processes 
- if humanisation or work  is affected,  and  new  technology  would 
appear  to fit that category,  then  there is a  further right of co-
determination.  There  are  joint responsibilities  throughout  and  the 
system is designed to  handle  change at the  workplace  through  what 
has  been  termed  "co-operative conflict resolution".  In Britain,  on 
the other hand,  there are  not statutory rights in this respect and 
only mild  legal obligations.  The  idea of joint responsbility for 
technological change  does  not exist.  British  trade unions  seek to 
control  the  introduction of new  technology at shopfloor level 
through collective bargaining with  the  occasional support of joint 
consultation;  there are  few  rights to be  invoked and  no  formal 
machinery  to be  followed.  British trade unions rely on  precedent 
(custom  and  pract~ce),  shopfloor bargaining power  and  the ability 
to take industrial action.  German  works  councils  do  not have  the 
ability to take  industrial action and  rely on  giving practical 
effect to the  employer's  legal obligations. 
In Britain shopfloor  industrial relations are  •adversarial'.  This 
does  not  imply  a  continuous  running battle or constant conflict -
the majority of manufacturing establishments  do  not experience  any 
industrial action during a  given year  (see  Brown  1981,  pp.S0-101). 
It means  that participative structures,  where  they exist,  are very 
much  secondary  to bargaining  mechanisms.  At  shop-floor level trade 
unions  retain an  'independence'  of action whatever  the  degree of co-
operation with management  which  exists within the enterprise.  In 
Germany  there is a  far greater degree of  'inter-dependence'  between 
works  council  and  management.  Both  sets of trade unions  are 
autonomous  but,  by  the  nature of the  systems  in which  they operate, 
they exercise that autonomy  in different ways  and  by  different 
means. 
3.2  Employers'  strategies 
Since  the  mid-1970s  both Britain and  West  Germany  have  been  faced 
with changing trading conditions,  a  slowing of economic  grow~h­
declining manufacturing  investment  and  rising unemployment.  The 
reasons for  these events are many  and  varied - domestic  and 
international fiscal  policy,  increases  in the  prices of raw 
materials and  energy,  increasing competition  from  developing nations 
and  between  industrialised countries,  and  structural changes  in 
products,  processes  and  the balance of trade.  The  response  to 
change,  in both countries,  has been  to seek ways  and means  of 
adapting to it - neither country has  sought to  radically alter the 
basic system of production  and  distribution.  This  adaptation has 
occurred,  and  is occurring,  in both  the  manufacturing and  service 
sectors of the  economy  - new  technology is a  common  and key element 
across  the  spectrum. - 14-
In adapting to change  three  important variables  can be  isolated and 
new  information  technology has  a  key  role  to play  in each: 
(1)  Structure of the product/service 
j 
For  new  markets  to be  won  product  innovation is required.  For 
greater cost-efficiency and  cost-effectiveness there are 
imperatives  to restructure services.  Speed of innovation is a 
vital factor.  Products  and  services are  becoming  increasingly 
complex  and  sophisticated and  at the  same  time  there are  demands 
for product/service standardisation to be  met.  Informat~on 
technology in many  instances provides  the  only  developmental 
road to follow. 
(2)  Structure of the enterprise/organisation 
The  pressures  to automate  and  modernise  products  and  services 
often generates  demands  to reduce  the  scale of operations,  lower 
fixed  costs  and  decentralise.  In production this often means 
smaller units and mbre  nationally and  internationally dispersed 
units.  The  nature of the  technology often facilitates 
international decentralisation.  With  regard  to services, 
terminals  and  data banks  can be  structured in any  way  to suit 
the  need  for centralisation or decentralisation.  Flexibility 
of production,  operation and  administration is made  possible. 
(3)  Structure of work  organisation 
Production  and  service efficiency demands  flexibility from  both 
the technology  and  its users.  New  systems of production and 
service provision are required.  There  are  demands  for  lower 
costs and  higher quality.  Work  has  to be  restructured and 
reorganised  to meet  these  demands.  Information  technology 
provides the means  to do  it. 
These  are not  the  only  three variables at work  in the production and 
manufacture of goods  and  services but,  given  the  economic  situation 
in  the  two  countries outlined earlier,  increasing importance is 
being placed upon  them.  The  'technology route'  is seen  by  many 
employers  in both  the manufacturing and  service sectors of the 
economy  to be  the  only way  out. 
The  contingencies  involved with the production and  distrib~tion of 
goods  and  services make  any  reference  to  "employers'  strategies"  a 
matter of generalisation.  different firms,  organisations,  sectors 
and  industries will  operate  under  a  variety of circumstances which 
will necessarily be  reflected in the kind of economic  decisions made 
and  strategies pursued.  However,  the  major characteristics of 
information technology - its cheapness,  reliability, flexibility, 
speed and  control  - provide it with  a  wealth of applications  and 
thereby constitutes an  option,  or rather a  range  of options,  for 
employers  in most  sectors of the  economy.  The  study will 
concentrate on  the  take-up  and  pursuit of those options,  and  their 
consequences  for  industrial relations,  in a  number  of limited 
sectors. - sectors where  information technology can already be  seen 
to have  had  an  impact.  However,  the  implications of information 
technology  is being  and will  be  felt in almost all areas where 
trade unions  are organised. -15-
Within  a  broad  framework  of adaptation to change  and  specific 
objectives,  a  number  of particular employers'  strategies in regard 
to the  introduction and  handling of new  technology  can  be 
delineated.  Essentially four strategies or approaches  may  be 
adopted  : 
1/  Unilateral  imposition 
The  introduction and handling of new  technology by managerial 
dictat:  a  'zero option'  approach based on  ultimatums - accept 
change  Qr  endanger  the  whole  operation.  Trade  unions  are 
offered the  'option•  of acceptance or rejection but consultation 
and  negotiation plays  no  part in  the  strategy. 
2/  Bargained  imposition 
Technical  change  is imposed  rather than negotiated  (either 
piecemeal or wholesale)  but,  following its introduction, 
bargaining takes place over manning,  wages,  work  reorganisation 
e~. 
3/  Negotiated solution 
The  trade unions  are  to be  consulted and  new  technology is to be 
introduced and handled by  means  of jointly negotiated agreement. 
4/  Participative solution 
The  employer  and  trade unions will  share  joint responsibility 
for  the  introduction and handling of new  technology  by  means  of 
full disclosure of information prior to  introduction and 
negotiated agreements  on  the basis of full participation and 
joint control. 
These  four strategies run  the  gamut  from  •unilateral control' 
to  'joint control'.  Employers  might not consciously adopt  any  one 
of the  four  but an  examination of practice will  document  the 
utilisation of at least one  of these  approaches.  The  strategies 
pursued will inevitably affect workplace  industrial relations as  new 
technology,  almost  inevitably,  has  an  impact  upon  job regulation. 
The  changes  in industrial relations brought about by  the 
introduction and handling of information technology will  now  be 
examined  with reference  to the sectors analysed and  the case studies 
conducted.* 
*  In addition to  the primary work  carried out  the  findings of other 
researchers,  conducting case studies  in similar areas,  have  been 
incorporated into the  text.  Of  particular note  are  the German 
studies of Bechmann  et al 1978  and  1979,  Brandt et al 1978,  ISI 
1981,  and  Weltz et al 1978,  and  the British studies of Forester 
(ed)  1980,  JCF  1982,  SPRU  WTS  1982,  and  Swords-Isherwood  and 
Senker 1980. -16-
3.3  The  introduction of information technology 
There  is nothing new  about  technological  change.  Many  industries 
and  organisations,  particularly in  the manufacturing sector,  are 
accustomed  to the  introduction and  handling of technological  change. 
However,  because  information  technology is perceived as  a  radical, 
if not revolutionary,  leap  forward  and  its large-scale introduction 
coincides with  the  deepest  economic  recession  in fifty years  (i.e. 
the  worse  recession ever experienced by  the  vast majority of the 
workforce),  the context!! new. 
Before new  information  technology,  or any  technology  for  that 
matter,  is brought  into operation,  there is usually  a  planning and 
introduction process  lasting several years.  It is extremely 
difficult to distinguish between  'planning'  and  'introduction'  as 
there is no  fine dividing line between  where  one  starts and  the 
other ends.  Broadly speaking  'planning'  refers  to the  process of 
defining aims,  information collation,  organisational analysis, 
developing strategies and  final  decision-making over the  degree of 
technological  change required,  time-scale  involved  and  the  changes 
to work  oganisation and manpower  planning necessitated.  The  term 
'introduction'  refers to  the  period  immediately prior to  the 
installation of the  machinery  and  equipment,  the actual  installation 
itself and  the reorganisation of the workplace  and workforce 
necessitated.  The  distinction between  'planning'  and  'introduction' 
is central  to  the  process of job regulation,  i.e.  industrial 
relations,  and  consequently  is seen as of prime  importance  to this 
study. 
3.3.1  Planning 
To  the firm/organisation  involved,  planning is based on  an 
assessment  of the  technology currently in use  and  analysis 
of the  potential applications of the  new  information 
technology.  Research  and  development will  exploit the 
technical possibilities ru1d  management  will assess cost, 
efficiency,  output etc.  New  information  technology  tends 
to be characterised by  lo~ production  costs but high 
development costs. 
All  the  case studies,  both British and  German,  pointed  to an 
intensive period of information search  and  analysis.  This 
was  largely as  a  result of company/organisation policy or 
directive.  Occasionally it was  the result of an  individual 
manager's  initiative,  but all the  major  changes  studied 
resulted from  company  planning policy.  Sources of 
information varied - the press  and  media,  universities, 
hardware/software  suppliers,  seminars,  consultants,  short 
courses,  exhibitions and  trade fairs,  specialist periodicals 
and  trade  and  research organisations - and  in all the 
studies more  than  one  source  was  quoted.  Awareness  was  high 
but this was  to be  expected as  the studies  focused  on  areas 
where  information  technology  was  in use. 3.3.2 
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In manufacturing the educational element of seminars  and 
courses was  seen to be  particularly important,  and  in 
relation to  CAD/CAM  internal  (R  and  D)  and  external 
(universities/polytechnics)  research organisations were 
prominent.  Internal research  and  development,  aided by 
consultants  and  suppliers,  figured  highly  in banking; 
whilst studies  in the office sector placed  ~ittle 
emphasis  on  internal development  but strongiy emphasised 
the role of the suppliers. 
In the  planning process,  in both British and  German  studies, 
th~re was  a  distinct lack of trade union  involvement. 
Managers  had  their sources of information,  as did  the trade 
unions.  However,  joint educational courses were  a  rarity 
and  joint assessment  and  analysis of information was 
entirely absent.  Trade  unions  were  excluded  from  the 
planning process until they  became  aware  that  information 
technology  planning was  being undertaken i.e.  usually up  to 
the point when  feasibility studies were  being conducted or 
consultants employed.  Consultation with  the  trade unions 
came  at the  ta~l-end of the planning process  and,  in  some 
cases,  after the planning process had been completed. 
Managers  (and many  trade unionists)  interviewed believed 
planning to be  a  managerial  function.  Trade  union 
involvement  came  after decisions  to go  ahead with particlar 
forms  of new  technology had  been  made  or,  at best,  when 
they  were  imminent.  Trade  unions  were  officially excluded 
from  the  planning process  in the British studies,  informal 
joint consultation being the  only direct input.  In Germany, 
despite co-determination,  trade  union  involvement  in  the 
planning process did not appear to amount  to a  great deal 
more  than  in Britain.  Specific case studies will be 
examined  later. 
Introduction 
Following the decision or decisions  to install information 
technology  a  process of introduction ensues.  It is at this 
stage,  in all the  cases studied,  that the  trade  unions  were 
involved at some  level.  In Britain this usually  involved 
consultations with  the  shop  stewards or trade union 
representatives at workplace  level.  National  trade union 
officials or even  full-time officials were  not  involved in 
the  introductory phase  and  nor was  there  any  attempt  to seek 
national,  company  or organisational  agreement  on  new 
technology prior to  introduction.  Technology  was  introduced 
at workplace  level  and it was  the  trade union 
representatives at that level  who  had  to make  the  initial 
response  to its introduction.  This was  also the case  in 
West  Germany  where  initial involvement  came  through  the 
works  councils. -18-
It ought to be  emphasised that all the British and  German 
data pointed to trade union  involvement  only  in the  l.atter 
stages of the planning and  introduction process.  It 
appeared that investment decisions  had  been  taken  and  work 
re-organisation plans  were  well-advanced if not 
determined.  The  trade union representatives and  shop 
stewards  in the British studies and  the  works  councils  in 
the  German  studies,  did not appear to have  any  influence 
over  investment  and  planning decisions.  In both countries 
the workplace  trade union representatives were  in a  position 
of reacting to decisions which  had  be·en  made  - decisions 
they  were  not privy to. 
A number  of strategies and methods  employed  for  the 
introduction of new  technology can be  identified from  the 
case studies and  they add  substance  to the general 
classification outlined in 3.2  : 
1.  Unilateral  imposition 
Secondary  sources point to  instances of  'take it or  leave 
it' situations.  In Britain there are a  number  of examples 
in the printing industry and  in Germany,  contrary to 
legal stipulations,  there are examples  of  11surpise 
installations"  (I.G.  Chemie  1981,  p.55). 
2.  Bargained  imposition 
The  process of introducing new  technology  and  then 
proceeding to bargain its operation was  exemplified in 
both British and  German  studies.  Two  particular 
strategies were  identified  : 
(a)  Trial  introduction - new  technology is introduced as 
an  'experiment'  or on  the  basis that it can be 
withdrawn at any  time.  If the trial is successful, 
and  there were  no  cases of  'unsuccessful'  trials, 
then acceptance is assumed  and  only  the details of 
operation need  to be  finalised.  The  'trial' manning 
arrangements  invariably become  practice and  work 
reorganisation and  payment  was  usually discussed 
during  the  'trial' period  (there being an  in-built 
assumption  that the  'trial' would  become  practice). 
The  'trial' carne  to  an  end  with  the signing of a 
formal  agreement.  Although  the  trade  unions  were 
said to be  involved in the  introduction,  the 
situation was  best described as  a  fait accompli. 
Trial  introductions could not  from  these studies be 
seen as  jointly "negotiated solutions". -19-
(b)  Piecemeal  introduction - new  technology  introduced in 
one  part of the workplace,  affecting only  a  few  jobs, 
and  then gradually introduced into other areas. 
The  process continues until  the  technology is 
sufficiently common  for  the  trade unions  to seek 
agreement  on  it, but tacit acceptance  will  have  been 
achieved and  manning  and  payment  arrangements  will  be 
partly or  wholly established.  The  trade unions are 
not bar·gaining over  the  introduction of new 
technology but are left seeking arrangements  as  to 
how  best it might  be  handled in  the  future;  they are 
consequently  in a  much  weaker  position. 
3.  Negotiated solution 
Consultation at the latter-end of the planning and 
introduction process,  followed  by  a  jointly negotiated 
agreement,  was  the  most  common  approach  in both sets of 
case studies  (although permission to conduct case study 
work  inevitably meant  that the  case studies could not be 
said to be  representative:  those.that have  'something to 
hide'  do  not generally welcome  research  from  social 
scientists, particularly when  they  are attached to 
organisations with strong trade union connections).  This 
approach  was  particularly prominent  in the  case studies 
in manufacturing  industry.  A consultation/negotiation 
formula  can  be  seen as  (a)  a  product of normal  practice 
(in Britain the Engineering Employers'  Federation 
recommends  the  approach)  and  (b)  a  result of a  marked 
lack of trade union opposition to  the  introduction of new 
technology  {survey reports suggest that less than  10%  of 
manufacturing establishments  see  trade union opposition 
as  a  major  problem  in  the  introduction of new  technology 
- see Bessant  1982,  pp.61-3 and  Northcott  and  Rogers 
1982,  pp.78-81). 
Within  the process of a  "negotiated solution"  two 
separate  techniques  were  discerned which,  without 
knowledge  as  to  how  widespread  the  practices are,  ought 
to be  noted  : 
1/  Information starvation - in  one  of the British 
studies  information  technology  was  introduced in one 
plant of a  large multi-plant company  in a  manner  and 
in a  form  which  had been rejected elsewhere  in  the 
company.  Managers  introducing it were  aware  of this 
but did not  inform  the workforce.  Lack  of 
information  and  lack of opportunities  to acquire 
information were  common  trade union  complaints:  the 
'mushroom'  treatment as  one  shop  steward put it -
,.kept  in the  dark  and  fed  on  manure". -20-
2/  Information bombardment  - the  German  studies pointed 
to a  number  of cases where  works  councils were 
bombarded  with  information on  ergonomic  aspects  of 
new  technology  (humanisation of work  assuming great 
importance  in the Federal  Republic  and  being a  matter 
for co-determination)  and  were  ostensibly 
11buried in 
work".  An  illusion of participation is fostered  in a 
process in which  there has  largely not been  any 
participaton.  The  attention of works  councils is 
diverted from  the  key  questions of manning, 
qualifications and  working conditions  (Briefs et al 
1979  and  I.G.  Chemie  1981). 
4.  Participative solution 
Examples  of .. participative solutions" as  defined  (see 
3.2)  could not be  found  in either the British or German 
studies.  There  were,  however,  examples of trade 
union/shop-floor  involvement  in  job design i.e. 
participation in matters of machine  manning,  operation, 
organisation and  lay-out.  It could not be  argued that 
there was  'joint control'  over either the  introduction of 
the  technology or the  consequent  manpower  planning,  but 
aspects of the introductory process did have 
participative elements  which  went  beyond  mere 
consultation and  negotiation. 
The  'planning'  and  'introduction'  processes of new 
technology  largely exclude  trade unions  to the point where 
they are reacting to change  rather than being involved in 
it.  No  control  can be  discerned being exercised over  the 
planning phase,  whilst the best that can be  said for  trade 
union  involvement  in  the  introductory phase  is that it 
affords opportunities for partial conrol.  The  ramifications 
for  industrial relations of information  technology 
introduction and  handling  in  the  sectors under  study will 
now  be  examined  more  closely with regard  to  the  case study 
and  secondary source  evidence. 
3.4  Workforce  implications - quantitative 
The  impact of new  information  technology  upon  employment  and 
unemp,loyment  is, certainly as  far  as  the  trade unions are concerned, 
the major  issue in the new  technology  debate.  The  take-up of new 
information technology,  however,  is not at a  sufficiently high  level 
in either Britain or Germany  from  which  to make  reliable 
predictions;  although  this has  not deterred conjecture and 
speculation.  This  study was  not  designed  to  add  fuel  to  these 
arguments  but as  industrial relations'  strategies and  policies are 
often based on  subjective perceptions,  and  employment  prospects  does 
form  a  key  element in bargaining,  it is necessary to outline 
attitudes and  assumptions  in this area both generally and  in the 
sectors examined. -21-
Those  who  make  forecasts  as to the  employment  implications of 
information technology can be  divided into "optimists" and 
"pessimists".  In Britain the "optimists" are  largely government-
sponsored or government-oriented  (see  ACARD  1980a,  CPRS  1978,  Dol 
1979;  NEDC  1980  and  Sleigh et al 1979).  A gloomier view is taken  by 
a  wide  range  of commentators  who  nonetheless give  information 
technology their stamp of approval  (e.g.  Barron and  Curnow  1979, 
Jenkins and Sherman  1979  and Stonier 1979}.  The  degree of pessimism 
involved is often dependent  upon  the degree  of social  change  which 
it is believed is required in order to avoid  the worse  ravages of 
'technolog~cal unemployment•.  Those  who  believe that the capitalist 
system  is beyond  any sort of  reform  in the first place tend,  short 
of the revolution,  to make  the  gloomiest forecasts  (CIS  1979, 
Harman  1979  and Hines  and Searle  1979).  The  debate is, of course, 
highly speculative.  It is  possible to examine  employment  trends 
and  collate figures  for sectoral job loss but  extrapolati~g from 
them  to predict employment  trends is a  high-risk venture. 
The  major point to be  made  in this study is that trade unions  in 
both countries are operating on  the  assumption that information 
technology will lead to a  loss of jobs.  In Britain there are 
predictions of 5  million lost jobs over the next 25  years  {Jenkins 
and Sherman  1979,  pp.116-123)  and  in Germany  the loss of 2.4 million 
jobs over 10 years  {Janssen 1980,  p.251).  The  accuracy of these 
predictions is largely irrelevant. - their authors share  the  view 
that job loss is not a  'zero sum'  game  and  argue  for radical 
redistributive policies to offset sectoral unemployment.  What  is 
important,  however,  is the fear that sectoral job loss will not be 
absorbed by  expansion in other areas.  The  impact on  industrial 
relations of a  shared perception that employment  opportunities are 
limited and will continue to be  limited in the  foreseeable  future, 
is a  concern that this study will  seek to explore.  The  level of 
concern differs between sectors and underlying assumptions  in the 
sectors studied require clarification. 
3.4.1  Word  processing 
In both the short and  long-term it is widely  held  that word 
processing equipment will have  a  negative effect on  office 
jobs  (see  SPRU  WTS  1982,  pp.SS-6).  It is an  assumption 
shared by  both British and  German  trade unions. 
Secretarial,  typing and clerical jobs are seen to be  most at 
risk  (APEX  1979  and 1980,  Bird and  Connell  1980  and  Siemens 
1976).  Both  the British and  German  studies point to 
considerable fears of short-term  job loss and  those  fears 
having industrial relations•  consequences,  although actual 
job loss as  a  result of information  technology was  more 
difficult to pinpoint  (see 3.6). -22-
3.4.2  Bankina 
3.4.3 
The  degree of job loss in the banking and  insurance sectors 
in the short-term,  i.e. over the next ten years,  is 
problematic.  Studies point to a  30%  reduction of staff 
(Nora  and  Mine  1978),  whilst others vary between  10%  {Pactel 
quoted  in BIFU  1981a,  p.4)  and  zero  (Sleigh et al 1979}. 
Despite predictions of a  growth  in services,  no  studies 
point to  a  growth of staff.  Evidence points to female  job 
loss  in  the banking sector  {Hummel  1980,  p.446  and  SPRU  WTS 
1982,  p.89).  It is widely  recognised that new  technology 
provides opportunities for  the  extension of banking business 
(~ojektgemeinschaft 1979 and  BIFU  1981b),  but in changing 
the nature of banking the studies demonstrate  trade  union 
concern with  job loss and  career prospects  (see 3.7). 
Manufacturing 
The  impact of NC/CNC  machines  and  the  development of CAD/CAM 
upon  job loss  in the manufacturing sector is a  cause of much 
debate.  'Reliable data is at a  premium.  Pesssimistic 
estimates have  pointed to a  50%  job loss over the next 10 to 
20  years  (Remmerswaal  quoted  in  CSE  1980,  p.61)  but these 
forecasts  need  to be  treated with  a  considerable degree of 
scepticism.  Similar forecasts  of high job loss resulting 
from  the  use of NC  machines  in the  1960s proved unfounded. 
Employment  in the  manufacturing sector has  proved  far more 
dependent  upon  the overall state of the  economy  than that of 
new  technology.  The  rate of diffusion of labour-saving 
equipment,  notably  DNC  and  CAM,  is expected to be  slow 
(Green et al 1980,  p.40).  Job  loss will occur in areas of 
the  shop-floor where  major  technological  changes  are  made 
(see  Bes&ant  1982,  p.58),  but  the overall  impact on 
employment  will  be  governed  by  speed of take-up  and  the 
state of domestic  and  world  markets  {see-Swords-Isherwood 
and Senker 1980,  p.22).  The  overriding cause of job  loss 
in the past has been  lack of competitiveness not  new 
technology  (Rothwell  and  Zegveld  1979,  p.118).  This  fact 
is widely recognised by  both sides of industry.  Job  loss 
has  occurred  as  a  result of  CNC  machies  and  CAD/CAM 
(Bechmann  et al 1979,  p.235 and  ISI  1981,  p.250}  and 
their widespread diffusion would  result in even greater 
job  loss.  However,  the  case studies point to a 
widespread  opinion that job losses will  be  even greater 
if new  technology is not fully  embraced  (see 3.8). 
3.5  Workforce  implications - qualitative 
Information  technology places new  demands  on  the workforce  and on 
the oraanisation of work.  In  a  number  of areas  these have  important 
industrial  rel~tions'  consequences.  Certain key  issues can  be 
highlighted: -23-
1/  Work  organisation 
The  interface bewteen  man  and  machine  has  long been an  area of 
social concern.  The  organisation of work  in the office,  in 
banking and  on  the  shop-floor has  been directly affected by 
information  technology  and will continue  to be  so  in the future. 
Work  reorganisation can have  a  major  impact on  job control 
(Cooley  1980),  participation  (Mumford  and  Sackman  1975)  and 
supervision  (JCF  1982):  all of which  affect  job regulation. 
2/  Skills 
New  technology results in changing skill requirements  across 
most  sectors  {Swords-Isherwood  and  Senker  1980).  It has  been 
argued that the  overall  impact is that of de-skilling  (Braverman 
1974)  but with most  forms  of information  technology it is a 
question of swings  and roundabouts  (CSS  1981).  Changing skills 
affect knowledge  requirements,  which  have  implications for 
apprenticeships  and  training,  and  they  can affect trade union 
composition  and  structure - demarcation  being a  particular 
problem  in Britain. 
3/  Humanisation  of work 
Work  reorganisation and skill changes necessitate an  analysis of 
ergonomic  factors  (see  Cooley  1980,  CSS  1981  and  Grunewald  et al 
1981).  Questions of autonomy,  team-work,  co-operation, 
polarisation and alienation need to be  examined  in the  light of 
technological  change.  The  problem of job satisfaction has  not 
assumed  a  high priority in terms of potential industrial 
relations'  conflict in the past,  but evidence suggests,  as  the 
manual  element in many  occupations  decreases,  that it could 
prove  increasingly important  in  the  future.  Certainly in both 
British and  German  case studies emphasis  was  placed  on  ways  of 
increasing  job satisfaction where  de-skilling had occurred  and 
on  the  potential of the  technology itself for providing more 
interesting and  rewarding  work.  Trade  union awareness of 
ergonomic  factors  was  high  and  this,  at least in Britain,  was  in 
contrast with earlier shop-floor studies of humanisation of work 
(see  Rathkey,  1977). 
4/  Health and  safety 
Allied to humanisation are matters of health and  safety at work. 
With  the  exception of potential health hazards  involved with 
VDUs  (see  APEX  1980),  it was  largely felt that information 
technology  would  improve  health and safety at the  workplace. 
Provided manual  drudgery  was  not replaced by  mental  drudgery,  it 
was  hoped  that working conditions - particularly in 
manufacturing  industry - would  improve. 
5/  'Nomen 
The  impact  of information technology  upon  areas of female 
employment  and  consequently upon  the  whole  question of women  at 
work,  is a  matter for  concern  (see  Bird  and  Conn~ll 1980,  Marth 
1980  and  SPRU  WTS  1982).  It is not clear from  the work  that has 
been done  in  this area or from  the  case studies reported here 
what  impact  the effect of information  technology  on  the nature 
of women  at work  will  have  on  industrial relations. -24-
The  quantitative and  qualitative effects of information  technology 
upon  the workforce  and  the  workplace  are difficult t9  ~auge both 
industrially and  nationally,  but particularly  in regard  to specfic 
sectors of economic  activity.  However,  what  is cerain is that they 
will  produce  changes.  Awareness  of the  inevitability of change  and 
uncertainty as  to  how  that change  will manifest itself at workplace 
level,  lies behind  many  of the attitudes struck in regard  to 
information  technology.  The  study will  now  focus  on  attitudes and 
experiences  in regard  to  information technology  in  the specific 
sectors which  were  examined. 
3.6  Word  processing and  office work 
Studies were  conducted  in both private and  public sectors -
insurance and  finance  and  public administration.  They  examined  the 
introduction of stand-alone word  processors  (WPs).  Shared work-
station and  printing facilities were  involved but  the major studies 
did not  involve  fully-developed  shared logic systems.  Central 
computer  and  microcomputer  systems  were  also present,  the latter on 
a  relatively small scale.  Neither system was  fully-integrated - the 
computing  systems  very  much  pre-dated the  introduction of WPs. 
Interword processor communication.  electronic mail  or other advanced 
forms  of data transmission were  not  present.  The  utilisation of 
information technology  in the office was  in its early stages.  It 
was  widely  accepted that more  sophisticated equipment  could  and 
would  be  introduced over the  next ten years. 
3.6.1 
3.6.2 
Attitudes  to  new  technology 
The  studies point  to  an  acceptance of the need  for  the 
application of information technology  in office work. 
Typists were  up-graded to  "word  processor operators".  job 
contents  were  extended in scope  and  job satisfaction was 
said to have  increased:  all of which  resulted in 
"positive'' attitudes.  In neither case were  there  job  losses 
as  a  consequence of the  introduction of WPs,  although there 
was  some  redeployment.  The  use  of information  technology 
was  very  much  in its early stages.  Trade  union 
representatives expressed fears  concerning the  long-term 
impact  on  jobs of a  more  widespread application,  but 
these  were  coupled with  fears of job  loss due  to business 
changes  and  in  the  services provided.  No  anti-technology 
views  were  expressed.  WPs  and  other  forms  of office 
information  technology  were  largely welcomed,  considered 
inevitable and  viewed  as  necessary for  organisational 
efficiency and  growth.  Organisational  growth  and  development 
through  information technology was  particularly stressed  in 
the private sector study.  With  very little qualification, 
management,  user and  trade union representatives'  attitudes 
at work-place  level  were  positive  towards  the 
introduction of the  technology  and future  developmental 
applications. 
Planning  technological  change 
Neither of  the major  studies nor primary  work  conducted  in 
the office sectors of the  manufacturing studies pointed  to 
any  meaningful  involvement by  trade  union representatives  in 
the  planning process. 3.6.3 
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In both British and  German  cases  the  trade union 
representatives were  informed about  the  imminent  arrival of 
WPs  in the office,  but  there  was  no  involvement  in data 
collation on  word  processor  technology,  information 
assessment,  organisational analysis or potential 
applications.  Discussions as  to the  implications of the 
introduction of WPs  into the office began when  the trade 
union representatives were  informed that the equipment was 
to be  introduced.  In the British study the planning process 
was  considered to be  a  managerial  function  and  an area 
unsuitable for  trade union  involvement.  The  trade union 
representatives utilised consultative procedures to probe 
present and  prospective plans  in regard to  information 
technology,  but they were  excluded from  such deliberations 
and considered that they had little influence,  if any,  in 
the planning process. 
In Germany,  although  there are  legal stipulations concerning 
disclosure of information on  matters  such as  new  technology, 
experience at work-place  level did not appear to be  any 
different from  that in Britain.  Works  councillors passively 
accepted their exclusion from  the planning process and  did 
not seek involvement  in matters of organisational analysis, 
nor in discussions  with  the  manufacturers of the  technology 
and  systems'  consultants. 
Evidence  from  other studies has  pointed to the down-playing 
by  trade union representatives of the de-skilling,  job loss 
and  stress implications of the  introduction of WPs  because 
it is largely  ttwomen's  work"  {IFO  1980).  The  problems 
associated with  WPs  were  considered to be  unimportant and 
therefore involvement in the planning process  was  largely 
irrelevant.  These  conclusions  could not be  drawn  from  the 
primary work  associated with this project.  There was  a 
definite awareness of potential problems with  WPs  but the 
handling of these problems  was  seen to occur at the 
introduction rather than  the planning stage.  Trade union 
representatives in both Britain and  Germany  did not expect 
to be  involved in the planning process but they did expect 
to have  a  say in how  the  technology was  introduced and  the 
conditions of its use. 
Introduction of information  technology 
In both studies the trade unions  played an  active role  in 
the  introduction of information  technology.  In  the British 
case this was  through  joint consultation and  the bargaining 
of a  'new  technology agreement•,  in Germany  through  the 
works  council.  In neither case  was  there a  radical 
installation of new  equipment.  New  technology was 
introduced step by  step.  If this was  as  a  direct result of 
an  organisational policy decision,  it was  not admitted.  WPs 
were  introduced "as and  when  required" or  "when  the budget 
permitted".  The  strategies pursued could be characterised 
as  "piecemeal  introduction" as a  form  of "bargained 
imposition"  (see 3.3.2). 3.6.4 
-~-
The  agreement  reached by  the  German  works  council with 
management  and  the  'new  technology agreement'  signed in the 
British case  did not differ to  any  marked  degree.  They  both 






no  compulsory redundancies arising from  new 
technology;  the  impact of new  technology  on  jobs to 
be  a  matter for discussion and  negotiation  (job  loss 
was  not ruled out in either case nor  was  'natural 
wastage') 
redeployment  and retraining of staff where  necessary 
(in the British case this included pay protection) 
disclosure of information regarding the operation of 
the equipment  (this did not appear to include 
information concerning future  plans,  although in 
Germany  this was  covered  - theoretically at least -
by  law) 
no  change  without consultation  (~  no  change  without 
agreement) 
health and safety protection and  ergonomic 
consideration e.g. efforts being made  to avoid 
unnecessarily routine work  or repetitive  jobs and 
emphasis  to be placed on  job satisfaction. 
Neither agreement offered shorter hours  (although  the 
British case resulted in more  flexible hours)  or guaranteed 
no  job loss.  They  both represented frameworks  for  future 
behaviour and  the  institutionalisation of the subject into 
work-place  industrial relations'  procedures;  they did not 
represent a  radical  departure  from  existing arrangements. 
As  collective agreements  they  did  not so much  lay down.hard 
and  fast rules as signify a  co-operative approach  to  the 
subject.  Both fell short of the  safeguards  and  conditions 
advocated by  the national white-collar unions. 
Both  studies emphasised a  spirit of co-operation on  the part 
of management  and  trade union representatives.  There  was  no 
conflict involved and  neither was  it envisaged. 
Handling new  technology 
In both studies the  workforce  had  previous  experience of the 
introduction of computerisation,  which  had  led to more 
rather than  fewer  jobs.  There  was  little or no  fear of new 
technology  and  hence  the  lack of emphasis  on  formal  job 
security provisions.  The  technological  change  was  neither 
rapid nor radical  (unlike some  of the  changes  in the 
printing industry which  have  engendered considerable 
conflict). 
The  workforces  had  been seen to gain from  the 
introduction of WPs  - up-grading,  flexible hours  and  job 
satisfaction - and  principles of consultation and bargaining 
had been  established.  The  introduction  and  operation had 
in both cases  worked  smoothly  - undoubtedly assisted by  the 
fact  that good  industrial relations were  hallmarks of both 
organisations prior to WPs  being  introduced. 3.6.5 
(3) 
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Offi.ce  technology  and  industrial relations 
The  case studies illustrate an  important facet of the new 
technology debate.  Predictions and  fears of job loss at 
national  and  sectoral levels may  not be  duplicated at work-
place  level.  The  absence of such concerns  undoubtedly 
influences practices and  procedures.  There are undoubtedly 
cases where  the introduction of WPs  adversely affects 
employment  (see  APEX  1980,  pp.33-34),  but equally cases can 
be  cited where  job growth has resulted - in fact it has  been 
claimed that the overall United States experience of WPs  has 
been one  of job growth  (see  SPRU  WTS  1982,  p.66).  As  far as 
industrial relations is concerned,  changes arising from 
office technology will almost certainly be  dependent upon· 
the specific nature of the proposed introduction.  Where 
radical  changes  are proposed,  with resultant job loss, 
conflict can  be  expected e.g.  in the printing industry  (see 
Cockburn  1982  and  Martin  1980)  where  technology  transformed 
blue-collar work  into white-collar work.  Where  information 
technology  is introduced into the office through  a  step-by-
step approach,  without  job loss and  no  discernible negative 
consequences  for  job content,  co-operation is likely.  The 
wider  debate will  impinge  upon  the particular case to the 
extent that it is perceived to represent the reality of the 
specific situation. 
The  case studies are not representative.  However,  other 
studies in Britain and  Germany  point to a  wide  variety of 
behaviour  and  agreements  concerning office technology. 
Office  technology  has  engendered conflict and is a  cause of 
potential conflict - the long-running saga of an  agreement, 
or rather the  lack of one,  on  new  technology for  the British 
Civil Service is a  particularly apposite case.  'New 
technology  agreements'  show  considerable variation in both 
countries  (see  Manwaring  1981,  IFO  1980 and Sedeno-Andre et 
al  1981)  and  their evolution demonstrates  a  variety of 
processes at work  - mostly within  the range of what  has been 
referred to as  "bargained  imposition"  and  "negotiated 
solution".  It is not clear from  the  gamut  of work  examined 
that the  "legalism" of the  German  industrial relations' 
system proved a  more  effective mechanism  for  introducing and 
handling  technological change  in the office than Britsh 
"voluntarism".  In theory the German  system should have 
provided more  information,  consultation and participation 
but in practice it did not appear to do  so.  More  striking 
was  the similarity betweeen  the constraints under  which  both 
British trade union representatives and  German  works 
councillors oprated and  the uneven nature of organisational 
experiences  with new  technology.  Work-place organisational 
factors clearly outweighed external  influences. -28-
3.7  New  technology  in banking 
Banking  in both Britain and  the Federal  Republic has  been one  of the 
least affected sectors by  cyclical fluctuations  (see  Brandt et al 
1978,  p.317  and  Sleigh et al  1979,  p.63).  Transactions and services 
have  increased  and  employment  growth  has been checked by  the 
widespread application of computerisation and,  more  recently,  of 
information  technology.  In-depth case studies were  unable  to be 
conducted in this sector  ~ut through  key  interviews with 
representatives  from  both sides of industry a  variety of primary 
data was  obtained.  A wide  range of secondary  evidence  was  also 
utilised. 
3.7.1  Automation  and  employment 
The  handling of a  large amount  of standardised information, 
particularly numerical  data,  makes  banking ripe for  the 
application of computerisation  and  information technology. 
Most  banking services can  be  automated;  it is more  a 
question of the  degree of automation possible and  the  degree 
desired.  Banking services have  expanded as  a  result of 
automation  and  the  relationship between service growth,  and 
consequent  job growth,  and  the application of new  technology 
is widely  recognised.  The  benefits of information 
technology  to  the  customerrs  and  the  industry is undisputed 
by  the  trade unions  concerned.  However,  the initial 
positive benefits to staff - flexible hours,  less routine 
work  and easier data access  - are now  being over-shadowed, 
at national  level,  by  fears of job loss.  New  technological 
developments  - "supermarket banking",  "satellite banking", 
automatic  telling,  counter terminals,  electronic  funds 
transfer and  new  methods  of data transmission  - are seen to 
be  moving  at a  pace  which  threatens  to check employment 
growth  and bring about  job losses  (see  BIFU  1982).  These 
national  concerns  have  had  an  impact at work-place  level. 
Throughout  the British and  German  banking sectors  there is a 
high  awareness of new  information technology,  both at work-
place and  supra-work-place  levels.  The  banks  have  proved 
highly profitable even  in recession  and  much  of that 
profit is being ploughed  into information  technology. 
Diffusion is high because  the  banks  can  aford it (unlike 
parts of the  manufacturing sector).  Rapid  technological 
advance  has  been  experienced,  changing  the nature of' many 
staff jobs,  and  is expected.  Trade union attitudes in both 
Britain and  Germany  were  consistantly "positive",  whilst 
seeking to exert influence over  the  introduction and 
handling of the  technology.  Competition,  customer  demands 
and  the  need  for service growth,  all conspired to promote 
the  acceptance of the need for  technological  change.  Trade 
union attitudes at national level reflected a  major concern 
with  job loss;  at work-place  level  the changing nature of 
jobs  and,  particularly,  consequent effects on career 





Planning  technological  change 
The  evidence gathered pointed to the  introduction of 
computer  and  information  technology  into banking by both 
co-ordinated and  unco-ordinated means.  Main-frame  central 
computing equipment  and  terminals  were  bought in pursuit of 
a  clearly defined strategy,  but a  wide  range of other 
equipment was  bought to  improve  immediate services without 
any  planned  integration appearing to be present.  It was  not 
possible  to elucidate what  was  the precise role of non-
integrated equipment in  long-term planning;  whether it 
resulted from  short-term decision-making or whether it 
fitted into an overall development strategy.  However,  the 
nature and  scale of much  of the  technology  introduced,  being 
introduced and  proposed was  such that lengthy and detailed 
organisational planning and  analysis was  entailed.  The 
planning process  was  not confined solely to individual banks 
but also involved cross-bank co-operation e.g.  CHAPS  I  and 
CHAPS  II  (see B!FU  1982.  pp.12-13},  EFT  (ELectronics Fund 
Transfer)  and  SWIFT  (Society for Worldwide  Interbanks 
Financial Telecommunications). 
In Britain a  number  of the major clearing banks  have  already 
taken steps to rationalise and reorganise their branch 
structures as  a  consequence  of the new  technology  (Midland, 
National  Westminster  and Co-operative).  Experiments with 
increasingly sophisticated automatic  telling machines 
(ATMs),  counter terminals,  viewdata  systems  and  "lobby 
banking",  all point to well-advanced plans for  the  extension 
of information technology.  The  major  banking trade unions 
in Britain and West  Germany  (BIFU  and  HBV)  are being 
excluded  from  the planning process. 
Banking  is changing rapidly - automatic  telling, credit 
cards  and  point of sale terminals in retail outlets all 
bring the  'cashless society'  closer.  Barclays has  developed 
a  system of corporate self-service banking  though Prestel 
and  a  number  of the German  banks  - Verbrauchen  Bank  and 
Deutsche  Bank  - have  developed  "home  banking"  systems.  The 
extension  and  development of these services throughout the 
banking system is bound  to effect staffing and  job content. 
Trade  union  in-put into the  planning process  in Britain and 
West  Germany  was  negligible. 
Introduction of information  technology 
There  is very little evidence of banks  in either Britain or 
West  Germany  signing formal  agreements  with  the trade unions 
concerning  the  introduction of new  technology.  The 
acquisition of formal  agreements  is the elear policy of both 
BIFU  and  HBV.  The  absence  of such agreements  has meant  that 
the  unions  have  had little or no  control over  the 
introduction of new  technology • 
Consultation has  occurred but  the  lack of stipulated 
procedures  and  agreements  has  meant  that cases of 
"unilateral  imposition" of new  technology  were  not 
uncommon  (e.g.  the  NIXDORF  system  in the  Midland  Bank  -
see  BIFU  'Report',  June  1982,  p.8).  At  best introduction 
has  been  by  "bargained imposition" but this has not resulted 
in formal  new  technology  agreements  being  signed. -30-
An  examination of trade union demands  in Britain and  West 
Germany  points to the lack of participation in the 
introduction and  handling of technological  change  in the 
banking sector.  In Germany,  the  union has sought 
'rationalisation protection agreements'  at work-place  and 
national levels.  These  constitute some  of the most  far-
reaching demands  in regard to new  technology put forward by 
any  union in the Federal Republic.  Effectively the unions 
want  co-determination at all stages  : 
*  all employers•  actions in the planning and 
reorganisation phases to be  regarded as 
•rationalisation'  measures;  including oganisational 
analysis,  consultancy,  organisational changes and  new 
techniques· 
*  works  councils to be provided with far greater 
disclosure of information and  the right to co-
determine·•rationalisation'  measures;  the works 
council should receive monthly  reports from  the 
employer  on  new  technology,  they should have  access 
to the  technology manufacturers  for information 
purposes  and  should be  allowed  the use of outside 
experts 
*  provisions to be  made  for  redeployment  (no 
dismissals),  retraining and  raising of skill levels. 
The  trade union has made  these demands  at national level 
and,  through  a  particularly active works  council  in Berlin, 
at work-place level.  Negotiations at national level have 
broken down  but the work-place  demands  have  gone  to 
arbitration.  If successful at work-place  level it could 
have  imporant  implications throughout  the banking sector. 
However,  the generally low  level of trade union activity 
would  suggest that,  even if a  precedent were  to be 
established,  'rationalisation protection agreements•  would 
not become  common. 
In Britain the major banking union,  BIFU.  is also at the 
stage of making  demands.  It wants to see fUll consultation 
and  negotiaton prior to change,  the signing of Technology 
Agreements,  planned work  sharing,  a  28-hour week  and 
provisions for redeployment and retraining.  The  lack of 
response  from  the employers  has forced  the union to adopt a 
more  asaressive approach,  even  to the point of threatening 
to refuse to operate the new  technology until agreement was 
reached  (see  CSE  1980,  p.108).  The  desire of the trade 
union to be more  closely involved in the introduction of new 
technology has fallen on  largely deaf ears.  The  union's 
present position is as follows:  "In the event of any 
employer refusing a  worthwhile  New  Technology  Agreement, 
BIFU  will have  to assess the  implications of the  technoloay 
being introduced by  the employer  and whether to advise 
members  to obstruct its introduction"  (BIFU  1982,  p.28). 3.7.4 
3.7.5 
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Handling  new  technolo~ 
The  failure of the banking unions  to exercise  any control 
over the  introduction of new  technology  has  reduced their 
effectiveness at the point of handling and  operating the 
equipment.  Agreements  on  wage  structures,  hours,  health and 
safety  and  job content,  have  been  concluded but they relate 
to work  rules and  general  terms  and conditions of employment 
rather than to new  technology.  The  ability to question and 
control  technological  change  at the work-place is largely 
absent.  This  is often a  result of low  levels of 
unfonisation and  trade union  involvement  (Streeck 1981, 
p.96).  Where  unionisation is strong,  such as  BIFU's closed 
shop  agreement  with. the Co-operative  Bank,  far greater 
success with  information,  consultation and participation has 
obtained.  In Britain BIFU  has  more  than doubled its 
membership  over  the past decade.  As  trade union membership 
rises,  and  proceeds  to  include  key  workers  such as  central 
computer staff,  so  trade union bargaining power  is 
strengthened.  It has  also been  argued that as new 
technology begins  to affect executive  and senior personnel 
so managerial  awareness of the negative effects of new 
technology will  be  raised  (Brandt et al  1978,  p.424).  It is 
certainly true that bank  managers  are  no  longer  exempt  from 
using  VDUs  and  other information  technology  equipment  (see 
"NatWest  first with  'electronic bank managers'",  Financial 
Times,  6.5.82). 
Bank  recruitment  is falling and  unionisation is rising.  New 
technology  in banking will  particularly affect female 
employment  as  women  form  a  majority of the  lower grades. 
The  ability of bank  employees  to  influence  the decisions on 
new  technology  which will affect their working lives will be 
largely determined by  their own  levels of concern and powers 
of motivation.  At  present both studies point to high levels 
of national concern  but problems of organisation and 
mobilisation at work-place  level. 
Banking  technology  and  industrial relations 
The  banking sectors of both countries are not historically 
known  for  high  levels of trade  union organisation or 
militancy.  The  attitude of the  unions  in both countries can 
be  summarise-d  by  BIFU's  statement that  :  "The  Banking 
Insurance  and  Finance  Union  is not opposed to new 
technology;  we  wish  to co-operate with  the  Employers  but 
this  can  only  take  place if the  Employers  are prepared to 
talk,  consult and  negotiate"  (BIFU  198la,  p.S).  The 
employers,  in their turn,  take  the  view that the  trade 
unions'  position on  new  technology is pessimistic and  that 
the  concession of formal  agreements  will extend 
unionisation.  Whilst  industrial action over new  technology 
has  so  far  been  avoided,  there  are definte signs that the 
trade unions  are beginning to adopt  a  more  aggressive 
approach.  If the  employers  continue  to thwart meaningful 
consultations  and  negotiations  on  the  subject and  at the 
same  time  seek  to  make  staff cuts,  as is likely,  then  the 
issue could well  have  a  serious effect on  industrial 
relations in the  banking sectors of both countries. -32-
Certainly in Britain the unions  have  used  industrial action 
and  the  threat of industrial action oy  key  computer staff to 
secure better wage  settlements  in the past. 
In banking little difference could be  discerned between  the 
introduction and  handling of new  technology  in Britain and 
Germany.  Legal  regulations to ensure  "co-operative conflict 
resolution"  proved little help  in securing formal  agreements 
on  new  technology  between  employer  and  employee.  The 
British unions  had  more  flexibility in terms  of taking 
industrial action  and  the  German  system allowed arbitration 
at work-place  level.  However,  these  were  largely cosmetic 
differences.  The  ability of British unions  to take 
industrial action on  the  issue had yet to be  put  to  the test 
and  it was  not clear whether  the  German  arbitration process 
could secure  a  new  technology  agreement.  The  actual 
practice in both countries suggested  that the  overall 
industrial relations'  framework  had  had little influence in 
facilitating the  introduction and  handling of new  technology 
to  the satisfaction of employer  and  employee  alike.  Both 
sets of trade unionists  lacked  information and  consultation 
rights and  involvement  in planning,  introduction and 
operation:  neither could effect a  satisfactory agreement 
through existing channels.  Both  believed in co-operation, 
but co-operation is generally regarded as  a  two-way  process 
and  most  of the traffic in banking appears  to flow  one-way. 
3.8  Information  technology  and  manufacturing industry 
The  case studies and secondary research in the  manufacturing sector 
were  concentrated on  the  introduction and  implications of computer 
aided design/computer aided manufacture  and  numerical 
control/computer numerical  control  machines. 
3.8. (a)  CAD/CAM 
Computer  aided design  and  manufacture  directly affects 
the work  of designers  and  draughtsmen  but in narrowing 
the gap  between blue-collar and  white-collar work  it 
could ultimately affect the  whole  of the manufacturing 
workforce  (see  CSS  1981,  pp.28-30).  The  integration of 
CAD/CAM  with  CNC  machines,  data  information  systems  and 
robotics  form  the basis of fully-automated manufacturing 
systems- the  'unmanned  factory'.  The  British study 
combined  CAD/CAM  with  a  large range of CNC  machines  plus 
a  management  data  information  system.  It was  by  no  means 
fully-integrated but the foundations  of an  integrated 
system  had  been laid.  The  German  study was  not as 
advanced  technologically as  CAD/CAM  was  in its early 
stages.  However,  the potential  for  advanced  integration 
was  present. r 
.. 
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3.8.(a).l  Attitudes  to new  technology 
3.8. (a) .2 
In both studies designers  and  draughtsmen accepted the 
inevitability of computer  aided design but attitudes 
towards it were  mixed.  In the British study  jobs had 
been lost but as  the  company  had  cut its overall 
workforce  by  one-third over the past three years,  due  to 
economic  recession,  it was  difficult to directly 
attribute this  to technological  change.  However,  the 
employment  uncertainties undoubtedly affected attitudes. 
The  major bone  of contention was  the skill changes which 
were  required and  the decline of traditional draughting 
skills.  CAD  did away  with  the need  for  many  routine 
drawings  and  produced higher quality and  more  consistent 
drawings  in a  shorter period of time  than through the old 
manual  methods.  Productivity was  raised and  the design 
team  shared more  information.  It was  difficult to 
objectively assess  the de-skilling involved but many  of 
the  designers felt that their role  in the engineering 
process  was  affected in a  negative manner.  The  autonomy 
of the  design draughtsman  was  said to be  affected and  the 
translation into a  CAD  operator was  seen as a  step in 
the direction of becoming  a  •machine  minder•.  It 
appeared that the  internal status of the designers and 
draughtsmen  - white-collar members  of •staff'  operating 
above  the shop-floor - was  under  threat.  In  the British 
study  the  CAD  operators prepared the  tapes for  the  CNC 
machines. 
The  work  of the  design  'programmers•  and  the  CNC 
'operators'  was  closely linked but the  fUnctions  were 
separate.  Other studies  (see  JCF  1982)  have  pointed to 
cases where  the  CNC  operators produce their own  control 
tapes.  The  latter is in fact  AUEW(ES)  policy and 
is a  potential source of conflict with  AUEW  (TASS) 
members  who  are at present largely responsible for  tape 
progra~ming.  The  studies did not point to conflicts over 
'who  does  what'  but they  did demonstrate  that CAD 
technology  can affect the attitudes of individuals to 
their role  in the  work  process.  In the multi-union,  role 
conscious situation which  pertains in much  of British 
manufacturing a  failure  to change  attitudes could be  a 
cause of industrial relations'  problems 
Planning technological  change 
The  introduction of CAD/CAM  and other forms  of 
computerisation in attendant areas  (in the British study 
this  involved the computerisation of quality control, 
stock control,  work  scheduling and  work  performance)  were 
not preceded by  employee  or trade  union  involvement  in 
the  planning process  in either the British or the German 
studies.  Information regarding the planning stages was 
not made  available to workforce  representatives.  Both 
cases were  conducted  in branch plants of multi-plant, 
multi-national  companies.  Any  information  ~hich was 
distributed at national  level  on  the  subJect did not 
percolate  down  to plant-level.  Information was  only 
disseminated when  'training'  programmes  were  introduced 
to familiarise  the design  and  drawing staff with the new 
technology. -34-
In  the light of the disgruntlement which  was  expressed 
with certain elements of the new  work  requirements,  it is 
of interest to note that at the stages where 
standardisation and  consequent  work  reorganisation were 
decided there  was  no  trade union or  •user'  input.  In the 
British study joint consultation did not extend  to these 
levels and  in Germany  the works  council had  no  legal 
influence over  the planning phase.  The  opportunity to 
influence decisions at an early enough  stage to exercise 
a  degree of control over the  introduction and operation 
of the  new  technology  was  denied.  Lack  of information 
and  involvement  meant  that the  workforces  and  their 
representatives  were  not participating in the process of 
technological  change,  they were  reacting to it. 
3.8.(a).3  Introduction of CAD/CAM 
In both cases elements of CAD/CAM  were  introduced in a 
"piecemeal" fashion  - there was  no  sudden  switch from 
manual  to computerised technology  .• 
This  process  in fact reflected the nature of changes 
on  the shop-floor and  in other areas of work  where 
CNC  machines  and  computerised systems  were  brought  in 
on  a  step-by-step basis.  The  technology was  in 
before  the trade union representatives began  to fully 
react to it. 
In  the British study formal  agreement was  sought on  new 
working arrangements,  productivity,  re-grading and  pay 
structures.  There  was  no  challenge  mounted  to  the 
technology itself and  nor was  a  "new  technology 
agreement"  sought,  although  that was  the  trade union's 
policy at national level.  After bargaining,  described 
as  'amicable',  an  agreement  was  signed covering all 
design  and  drawing staff.  It essentially took  the  form 
of a  productivity agreement;  it made  minor  changes  to the 
grading structure  (and  hence  pay),  built certain 
safeguards into the operation of the  equipment  (mainly 
concerning  the use of VDUs)  and  made  provisions  for 
retraining.  There were  no  job security provisions or 
reductions  to working hours.  Any  such changes  would  have 
had  to have  formed  part of a  company-wide  agreement. 
The  German  study also resulted in a  formal  agreement 
being signed to cover CAD/CAM  but,  unlike  the British 
case,  this was  after considerable employer  opposition. 
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The  works  a~reement was  only  signed following 
arbitration.  Also its coverage  was  limited to visual 
display units,  microfilm readers  and  other computer-
supported optical  equipment.  The  computers  and  the 
programmes  which  drove  them  were  not  covered by  the 
agreement.  'l'he  works  council  had  no  rights concerning 
the basis of CAD/CAM  technology,  its rights only extended 
to certain external manifestations of the hardware.  Its 
ability  to  influence  technological  planning and 
introduction was  as  limited  in  scope  as its British 
counterparts.  The  works  council  was  granted  information 
and  consultation rights under  the  agreement,  but this was 
restricted to data equipment.  The  major  elements of 
existing CAD/CAM  and,  perhaps  more  importantly,  future 
developments of integration were  excluded.  The  agreement 
referred to the  specific conditions under  which  the 
technology was  to be  operated - multi-task jobs,  breaks 
when  using VDUs,  safety,  training,  and  performance  and 
behaviour monitoring  (no  data collection on  these latter 
two  areas) •.  It made  little reference  to  the process of 
introducing new  technology  and  did not provide for  job 
security,  shorter working hours or  joint monitoring/ 
assessment of technological  change. 
In neither the British or  the  German  cases was  anything 
approaching  a  'new  technology  agreement'  struck.  The 
bargaining and  consultative procedures  proved  inadequate 
to the  task.  TI1ere  was  a  lack of information and  trade 
union  policy was  either ignored or was  not raised.  In 
the German  case  the  works  council  had difficulty in 
involving the designers  and  planning engineers  in 
discussing the role of new  technology.  In  the British 
case the designers  did not believe  that their interests 
and problems  in regard to new  technology were  identical 
to those of the  shop-floor.  Whether  further  integration 
of the  manufacturing process will  break  do~1 these 
barriers or merely erect new  ones  is problematic. 
3.8.(a).4  Handling new  technology 
In  the British case  ttlere were  no  major  problems  with  the 
handling of the  equipment.  Industrial  relations were 
good  and  once  the agreement  was  signed there were  no 
operational problems.  There  was  a  high  awareness  of the 
company's  problems  in selling its products  and  the 
delicate position of the plant.  Fears of total plant 
closure meant little or no  opposition to  job loss.  The 
•technology route'  was  seen as  the only path for  the 
company,  and particularly the plant,  to follow.  Operating 
as it did in a  high  technology  industry  there was 
widespread trade union support  for  its application.  A 
"new  technology agreement"  was  not being sought. -36-
In  the  German  case  the  works  council  had discovered that 
they  had little legal protection when  it came  to the 
introduction and  handling of'  CAD/CAM.  In fact  the 
employer  was  pursuing his opposition of the agreement 
through  the courts.  The  employer  did not recognise  the 
even limited rights of information and  consultation which 
the works  agreement  had,  after arbitration,  given to 
workforce representatives.  Until  the matter was  legally 
resolved  the arbitrators'  ruling stood.  However,  should 
the courts  rule  in favour of  the  employer  the agreement 
would  fall. 
3.8.(a).5  CAD/CAM  and  industrial relations 
3.8.(b) 
CAD/CAM  brought  new  technology  to  a  section of the 
workforce not noted for militant trade unionism.  It 
affected jobs  and  raised the prospect,  certainly in large 
companies,  of more  radical future  developments  (see  CSS 
1981,  pp.28-30).  It presaged a  more  integrated and 
controlled workforce.  Its  impact  upon  industrial 
relations,  however,  proved more  difficult to gauge:  it 
was  a  potential source of conflict but  there  was  little 
evidence  to suggest that it would  lead to conflict. 
The  two  studies did not suggest prospective conflict, 
regardless of the extent of integration or concerning the 
validity of the  German  works  agreement,  and other work 
has  pointed to a  lack of trade union resistance to 
innovaticn  in this sector  (see Francis et al  1981,  p.S). 
At  the  level of the  individual opposition was  equally 
unlikely  (Bechmann  et al  1978,  p.80).  Conflict,  if it 
was  to arise,  was  more  likely to be  between  unions 
(demarcation)  or occupations  (status). 
In  terms of introducing and handling new  technology,  the 
comparative data pointed  to similar problems.  The  German 
works  council  had achieved  through  the  law  what 
(generally)  the British trade union representatives had 
negotiated on  a  voluntary basis.  The  German  agreement 
was  under  threat;  the British agreement  appeared  to  be 
operating well.  Neither  agreement gave  the  workforce 
much  control over or participation in the  introduction 
and  operation of the  new  technology.  A lack of 
information and  involvement  in  the planning process was 
evident  in both studies. 
NC/CNC 
Numerically-controlled  (NC)  machines  have  been 
introduced into manufacturing  industry since  the  1940s. 
It is their more  sophisticated version,  computer 
numerically-controlled  (CNC)  machines,  which  represent 
the  'new  technology•.  Allied to  CAD/CAM  computer aided 
production  (CAP)  is possible.  The  end-product of a 
"flexible manufacturing system"  (FMS),  incorporating 
robotics,  would  eliminate  a  large  amount  of the human 
element  in the  manufacturing process.  The  ~ase studies 
did not  examine  such sophisticated flexible  systems,  but 
in both  CNC  equipment  was  part of the computerisation of 
a  wide  range of manufacturing elements.  Further use of 
information  technology and its integration was  probable. -37-
3.8.(b).l  Attitudes  to new  technology 
Both  studies provided evi.dence  of a  "positive" attitude 
on  behalf of the  workforce  to new  technology.  Similar 
findings  in regard to  NC/CNC  machines  has  been  produced 
elsewhere  (Francis et al 1981.  JCF  1982  and  ISI  1981). 
The  British shop  stewards  and  German  works  councillors 
identified with  the  company's  aim  to strengthen its 
position  in the  market  and  felt that they could not hold 
back "technical progress".  CNC  machines  were  generally 
regarded as  another version of NC  machines  with which 
they  were  familiar.  Both  compru1iee  had  been  adversely 
affected by  the  economic  recession and  there was  clear 
evidence  of a  desire to "pull  together"  to raise the 
company's  fortunes.  The  11technology  route"  as  a  means  of 
organisational  growth  and  competitiveness was  not 
questioned  by  the workforce.  The  need to protect jobs 
was  a  const~nt theme  and  one  which  obviously underlay 
much  of  the  considerations of the  trade union 
representatives  in both countries.  However,  both 
companies  had  recently undergone  large voluntary 
redundancy  exercises.  A view of "shedding jobs  to 
protect jobs"  could be  said to prevail.  In  the 
British study,  conducted  in  an  area of high  unemployment, 
the  shop  stewards had  long urged  the  company  to  invest  in 
the plant.  Investment had  taken place but much  of that 
capital equipment now  lay  idle due  to  lack of orders. 
The  shop  stewards  did not believe  that rejection of new 
technology  was  an  option;  in fact,  despite  job  losses, 
they believed that the  future  of the plant rested on 
efficiency born  of high  technology.  Jobs  were  to  be 
protected wherever possible  and  status should  be 
retained,  plus negotiations on earnings and bonuses.  New 
technology  was,  l].ke  the  annual  pay  round,  a  matter for 
collective bargaining. 
3.8.(b).2  Planning  technological  change 
The  introduction of NC  and  CNC  machines  had,  in both 
studies,  been  a  staged process.  However,  both  had 
witnessed a  large  influx of CNC  machines  which  had 
precipitated new  agreements.  In  terms  of organisational 
analysis  in  the  planning process participation had been 
minimal.  Both  studies were  in branch plants of multi-
national  companies  and effective trade  union  involvement 
stopped at plant level.  Consultation at company  level 
did not provide  information as  to  the detailed planning 
of technologcial  change.  In the British study  a  form  of 
prior involvement  was  experienced when  workforce 
representatives were  taken  to  Italy to examine  the 
performance  of the  CNC  machines  which  the  company 
(British-owned)  was  proposing to buy.  This exercise  was 
solely  designed  to prevent conflict of the patriotic "buy 
British
11  variety.  It could hardly be  described  as  an 
input into the  planning process. -38-
In stating that  the  workforce  were  not  involved  in  the 
planning process,  both studies pointed to  the fact that 
generally  the  shop stewards  and  works  councillors did  not 
desire  this kind of involvement.  They  wanted  to be  made 
aware  of prospective changes but more  by  way  of 
information than  involvement.  The  British shop  stewards 
particularly did not  view  company  level participation as 
a  desirable goal.  However,  at plant level  the  opposite 
view prevailed and  they  sought  a  far greater  say  in 
decision-making  than  that which  they  possessed.  At  plant 
level  they  wanted  participation in order  to extend  their 
control  over  job  regulation.  Above  that level  they  did 
not  see it as  part of their function  to take 
responsibility for,  or  be  a  party to,  decisions that were 
taken.  There  was  a  definite  'plant'  mentality or 
solidarity which  invoked  far greater allegiance  than  did 
the  company  as  a  whole. 
3.8.(b).3  Introduction of new  technology 
The  arrival of major  instalments of  CNC  machines  was 
preceded  by widespread consultations and  information. 
Co-operation  ~11 involvement  was  actively sought  to  a  far 
greater degree  than  in any of  the  other studies.  The 
companies  operated from  a  position where  they had 
workforce  acceptance of the  technology  in principle but 
had not obtained agreement  as  to how  and  under  what 
conditions  the  technology  would  be  operated.  Both 
companies  went  beyond  their formal  systems  of joint 
consultation and  regular meetings  with  the joint shop 
stewards  and  works  council  to  ensure  a  smooth 
introductory process.  As  there  was  no  question of a 
"take it or  leave  it" situation,  the  introduction of CNC 
machines  in both cases  could  be  said  to  be characteristic 
of a  "negotiated solution". 
The  key  problem  areas  were  earnings.  status and  jobs 
{probably  in  that order).  In  the  British study  the 
question of earnings was  overcome  not  by  re-grading but 
by  the  movement  from  a  'payment  by  results'  system  to 
'measured  day  work' •  Removal  of the  vagaries of the  PBR 
system consolidated ru1d  improved  earnings.  In Germany  a 
new  productivity agreement was  signed. 
Status  was  a  particular problem.  In  the British study  an 
agreement  was  reached whereby  the  skill level of the 
operator would  be  a  reflection of  the skill  level 
required for  the operation that the  new  machine  had 
replaced.  That  is,  where  an  operation had  been  the 
responsbility of a  craftsman  (most  cases)  the  CNC  machine 
was  operated by  a  craftsman but where,  as  in drilling and 
milling,  a  non-time-served man  had  done  the  job he  could 
continue  to  perform  that function  with  the aid of CNC 
equipment.  In  Germany  the  demarcation  pr·oblems  were  not 
so sensitive.  AgreeJTlent  was  reached that no  workers 
would  be  down-graded  as  a  result of CNC  machines,  even 
though  redeployment  would  be  required. -39-
The  thorny problem  of jobs was  solved by  time  and  a 
general contraction of the  two  workforce&.  There were  no 
immediate  redundancies,  although a  certain amount  of 
redeployment was  necessitated in both  firms.  A process 
of natural  wastage  and  voluntary redundancies as a 
consequence of overall workforce contraction solved any 
problems  of required  job loss. 
Workforce  representatives did not seek a  "new  technology 
agreement",  neither did  they see  the  need for  one.  The 
CNC  machines  were  introduced through  the traditional 
means  of collective bargaining in Britain and collective 
agreement in Germany.  The  economic  determinants of pay 
and  conditions  (the German  works  council securing bonus 
and productivity payments)  were  paramount.  Ergonomic 
considerations did not surface  in either case. 
3.8.(b).4  Handling new  technology 
CNC  machines  undoubtedly affect traditional skills. 
Automatic  tool-setting and  in-process gauging de-skill 
traditional grinding and  machining operations.  Through 
logged repetition the skills and  expertise of the 
operator are transferred to the control  tape or may  be 
transferred  from  the  operator to the  programmer.  It is 
possible for the programming  and  operating  functions  to 
be  merged,  but this was  not done  in either of the main 
studies.  At  present CNC  operators who  programme  their 
own  machines  are rare  (see  JCF  1982,  p.97 and  Weidemann 
et al 1981,  p.89)  but there are moves  through official 
trade union channels  to make  this practice more  prevalent 
and  increase  the skill content  involved.  If operators do 
take-over  programing this will upset  the traditional 
white-collar/blue-collar balance of the workforce. 
Information  technology  operates to erode  such 
distinctions. 
The  low  priority which  is given  to ergonomic 
considerations,  exemplified in both studies,  has  allowed 
management  largely to dictate work  organisation.  Lack  of 
information has resulted in companies  or the 
manufacturers  drawing  up  training programmes  which 
exclude  programming skills  (ISI  1981,  p.241). 
Programming  and  operating functions  are separated out, 
often in order not  to upset existing arrangements. 
However,  the more  integrated the  manufacturing system 
becomes  so flexibility as well  as specialisation becomes 
an  essential requirement.  As  data is linked and 
transferred so are skills.  Although  the studies do  not 
provide an  answer,  it may  well  be  that the German 
industrial union system  (one  union  per  industry)  is 
better equipped to  cope  with  the  changing nature of work 
and  work  organisation. -~-
One  interesting difference between  the  two  cases was  that 
the  German  works  agreement  forbade  the collection of data 
on  the monitoring of performance  and  behaviour.  In  the 
British study  the  change  of payment  system meant that 
control over operator performance  was  lessened.  To 
ensure that operator performance  did not  drop  the 
management  introduced a  system of computerised data 
collection which  monitored  the  performances of individual 
machines  and  their operators - even  to  the point of 
naming  the operators on  the print-out.  Operator 
performance  rose.  This  system was  introduced without 
consultation and,  in fact,  was  contrary to practice 
elsewhere  in the  company.  It certainly conflicted with 
official trade union  policy. 
CNC  machines  do  offer the prospect of multi-machine 
manning.  This  idea was  rejected  in  the British study due 
to adverse effects on  jobs.  It was  considered  to be  a 
matter for national rather  than  local negotiation. 
In both  cases  the  new  technology  was  introduced and 
handled at plant level.  It was  the joint shop  stewards 
committee  and  the w0rks  council which  made  the  major 
decisions,  in conjunction with  management,  as  to how  the 
technology was  to be  operated.  External  trade union 
influences were  minimal:  it was  essentially a  matter of 
shop-floor bargaining. 
3.8.(b).5  Computer  numerical  control  and  industrial relations 
The  trade unions  in manufacturing  industry in both 
Britain  and  West  Germany  have  traditionally been strong 
compared  to their counterparts  in other sectors of the 
economy.  Their strength has been  based on  shopfloor 
organisation and  bargaining power.  A system of job 
regulation - industrial relations - has arisen which 
reflects those characteristics and  the way  in which  they 
are distributed among  the various sections of the 
workforce.  CNC  machines  form  part of a  trend in 
manufacturing which alters traditional job distinctions 
and  affects job control.  The  trend is towards  the 
integration of many  if not all the  major  elements of 
the production process  i.e.  planning,  organisation, 
design,  communciations,  supervision,  control, 
maintenance,  production and  distribution.  Although not 
necessarily  immediately apparent,  this trend will 
undoubtedly affect the  future  course of industrial 
relations in the  manufacturing sector. • 
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The  case studies point to the  changing nature of skills 
and their implications for  work  organisation.  De-
skilling occurs and attempts to redress  the balance by 
the  incorporation of programming skills could result 
in demarcation,  status, blue-collar/white-collar 
conflict.  Job  loss has also resulted but changing 
~arkets and  economic  recession have  prevented any 
potential conflict regarding  'technological 
unemployment'.  The  high degree of acceptance of new 
technology in the manufacturing sector casts doubt  on  the 
view of trade unions  as  a  major barrier to innovation. 
Decreasing individual  job control  and  increasing 
managerial control  (performance monitoring)  are potential 
problem areas.  The  ability of trade unions  to 
"bargain away"  such problems  at shopfloor  level has 
to be  doubted,  although the desire to seek solutions 
through other means,  such  as participation,  has,  at 
least in Britain,  to be  questioned.  The  superiority 
of one  industrial relations'  framework  over another 
in introducing and  handling new  technology has also 
to  be  questioned.  The  case studies point more  to 
common  weaknesses  and  shared problems. 
Case  studies of other companies  in the manufacturing 
sector provide examples of different approaches  and 
solutions  (see  IRRR  1982  No.266  and Bamber  1980). 








little or no  workforce  involvement  in the  planning 
process 
new  technology  introduced by  means  of traditional 
collective bargaining and  agreements  - largely un-
suitable for  the  purpose 
new  technology handled at plant level with few 
external  influences - producing both positive and 
negative effects 
consultation and  information largely inadequate 
for  the  task 
official union  policy often ignored  in favour of 
'local'  solutions 
high acceptance  of new  technology  and  few 
industrial relations problems  associated with it  • -~-
The  latter statement may  appear paradoxical when  related 
to the others but,  evidence  suggest,  it is nonetheless 
true.  This  is because  the  dominating factor  in terms of 
industrial relations in the manufacturing sector is the 
impact of the economic  recession.  New  technology is not 
.so much  viewed  as  a  problem as it is the  answer  to a 
problem.  Whether  opinions will  change  in the light of 
economic  recovery  is a  matter for speculation.  The  case 
studies do,  however,  indicate  a  diversity of practices 
and  responses in different sectors of the economy. 
These  owe  little to the overall industrial reations' 
framework  in which  they operate,  be  it 'legalistic' or 
'voluntaristic',  and  a  lot to  the  particular 
characteristics of job regulation  in those sectors. 
• (4) 
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4.  INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY.  :  THE  TRADE  UNION  RESPONSE 
4.1  Organisational limitations 
The  study has  already noted  the different industrial relations• 
frameworks  and obligations under which  British and  German  trade 
unions operate  (see 2.1  and  3.1).  In moving  from  workplace  level 
to wider aspects of the  trade t.::·.ion  response,  it is pertinent to 
underline  some  of  the  differences observed;  particularly as  they 
relate to the  impact of new  technology. 
4.4.1  Structure 
Unlike other countries,  trade unions  in the Federal 
Republic are unitary i.e.  they represent all the workers  in 
one  sector of the  economy.  In Britain industrial·unionis• 
is the exception rather than  the rule - most  large trade 
unions  have  an occupational basis but growth  and 
amalgamations  have  served to broaden  the membership.  The 
main  structural difference between  the  two  countries is 
that in West  Germany  one  union will represent all the 
workforce  in a  particular company  or organisation,  whilst 
in Britain most  large companies will recognise  a  number  of 
unions as representing different sections of the workforce. 
Different unions  representing different occupations within 
the  same  company  or organisation is common  in both blue-
collar and  white-collar sectors of the British economy. 
Thus  whilst the German  system endeavours  to emphasise  the 
solidarity and  commonality of employees,  the British trade 
union  system projects sectional interests.  These  sectional 
interests are  invariably based  on  occupation and reflect a 
national obsession with class,  rank  and  status (aptly 
illustrated by  five different unions  for different grades 
of white collar workers  w:thin the civil service or 
manufacturing  industry where  different unions can represent 
general workers,  craftsme,,  supervisors,  cerical workers. 
technicians and  management  within the  same  company). 
The  different trade  union  structures have  affected 
attitudes  to new  information  technology,  as  we  will  examine 
more  closely later.  Generally-speaking German  trade unions 
have  to devise policies •  thich reflect the  interests of 
their diverse membership  within a  particular industry  (cf. 
Streeck 1979,  p.242).  They  have  to seek to overcome  the 
occupational  and  sectional interests of their membership  to 
arrive at a  common  apprcach.  In Britain trade unions often 
highlight sectional interests for organisational purposes. 
British trade unions  may  see  the wider perspective but the 
nature of their members~ip may  lead to  a  sectional 
approach.  The  tendency of  informat~on technology  to break 
down  occupational barriers has,  and will  increasingly have, 
an undoubted  impact of intra-union developments  and  inter-
union relations. 4.1.2 
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Agreements 
The  separate legal status of British and  German  collective 
agreements has been referred to earlier.  It has been 
argued that German  collective agreements serve  three 
functions  (see Recht  auf Arbeit 1981.  p.220): 
1. protective function - employers  and  unions 
negotiating provisions which  protect workers• 
interests 
2.  stabilising function - a  collective agreement 
defining certain aspcts of the  employer-employee 
relationship over a  period of time 
3.  peace  function - industrial action illegal by  either 
side in order to  change  the status quo  during the 
currency of an  agreement. 
British collective agreements  can be  said to serve the 
first two  functions  but not the last;  they neither 
guarantee  the  agreement against it being broken nor do  they 
incorporate  legal  sanctions if it is.  In Britain the lack 
of a  "peace function"  reflects the adversarial  approach:  in 
Germany  it is a  reflection of the  legal co-operative 
approach.  The  nature and  level of collective agreements  in 
the  two  countries has meant  the establishment in Germany  of 
a  strong  'formal system'  and  in Britain of a  strong 
'informal system'  (see Donovan  1968).  The  bargaining 
framework  is therefore somewhat  different and  susceptible 
to different pressures.  A number  of other factors besides 
trade union structure and  organisation have  helped to 
determine  approaches  to new  technology. 
4.2  Key  determinants of union behaviour 
Trade unions  do  not operate  in a  vacuum.  Their behaviour is 
governed by  a  mixture of internal and  external  forces.  In  terms of 
strategies towards  new  technology a  number  of key  influences are 
worth highlighting:  the state of the economy,  changes  in 
collective bargaining,  the nature of trade union power  and  the 
growth of white-collar trade unionism. 
4.2.1  The  economy 
The  1970s saw  a  decline in both the British and  West  German 
economies:  in Britain this represented a  fall from  a 
modest  growth rate to zero growth  and  in the 1980s  to an 
actual contraction of the economy;  in West  Germany  the fall 
was  less dramatic  from  high growth  during the  •economic 
miracle'  to modest  growth.  Both  economies  have  been 
characterised by rising unemployment.  Living standards, 
which  rose  throughout the 1950s,  1960s  and  early 1970s,  are 
levelling off where  not actually falling.  The  deepening of 
economic  recession  in the West  (which  perhaps  can be  dated 
from  the five-fold oil price rise of 1973)  has caused trade 
unions  to re-think,  if not actually change,  bargaining 4.2.2 
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strategy.  The  dark  clouds of economic  recession hang over 
all trade union discussions of new  technology  and  influence 
behaviour. 
Bargaining issues 
The  1960s  and  early 1970s  in Britain were  characterised by 
a  period of  'productlvity bargaining•  - obtaining the right 
"price" for  changing  technology  and  working practices. 
Collective bargaining devolved  to  the  shop-floor  (see  Clegg 
1972,  pp.442-445).  The  1970s has witnessed  the 
institutionalisation of the  'informal system'.  Shop 
stewards have  been absorbed  into formal  negotiating 
arrangements with the growth  of single-employer bargaining. 
The  growth  of closed shop  agreements,  check-off,  full-time 
stewards and  consultative committees has pointed to a 
formalisation of industrial relations and  an  increased 
management  involvement  (see  Brown  1981,  pp.Sl-79).  As 
collective bargaining has  changed  so has its scope. 
Bargaining has  developed beyond  the  fixing of wage  rates, 
often as  a  result of management  wishing to  'sell'  a 
particular package  of payment  system  and  working practices 
(see Roeber  1975}.  The  widening scope  of collective 
bargaining,  the  institutionalisation of job regulation at 
plant level  and  the  growth of joint consultation,  all have 
implications for  the strategic approach  to new  information 
technology. 
The  German  system of industrial relations and  bargaining 
has  also undergone  changes  in  the 1970s which  affect its 
present strategy and  behaviour.  Whilst  in Britain the 
process  can be  described as  a  movement  from  the  informal  to 
the  formal,  in Germany  it has  been  the reverse.  The 
inflexibility of formal  arr·angements has  seen a  growth  in 
the  influence of the  shop-floor and  an  expansion  in the 
role of works  councils.  In Britain the  shop  stewards 
committee has  become  legitimised;  in Germany  works  councils 
have  become  less formal  &1d  their role has  developed  from 
that of 'arbitrators'  to  'bargainers•.  In many  respects 
the  roles played by  shop  stew~ds committees  and  works 
councils are comparable;  there  has  been  a  distinct 
convergence  in recent years. 
The  broadening of collective bargaining from  purely 
quantitative demands  to  increasing concern with qualitative 
matters,  a  trend discernible  in both countries over the 
past decade,  has  come  about  largely as  a  direct result of 
changing technology.  Changes  in  the  labour market, 
partcularly wholesale  job loss,  have  undoubtedly  influenced 
the  trend but the catalyst has  invariably been changing 
technology.  In shifting the  emphasis  from  the 
quantitative  to the qualitative  the  underlying concern has 
oeen that of job protection.  Attempts  to bargain job 
protection emerged,  naturally enough,  in those  industries 
directly affected by  either new  technology  or economic 
recession;  of  partic~lar importance  in both countries were 
negotiations in the printing industry  and  engineering 
(metalworking)  industry. 4.2.3 
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In printing radical  technological  change  was  not adopted 
without conflict,  particularly in Britain  (see Martin 
1981),  with  job protection the key  issue.  Agreements  in 
the printing industry have  emphasised protection of grades 
and  traditional areas of work  (even  though  the  technology 
has  changed),  security of earnings,  retraining, 
redeployment and  joint monitoring  (see Riehle et al 1979, 
Martin 1981,  IRRR  No.271  1982  and  JCF  1982). 
Job  protection was  also a  key  element  in the  1978 
agreements  in the British engineering and  German  metal 
working  industries.  In Britain "status quo"  clauses were 
established - no  change  without  agreement;  whilst in 
Germany  emphasis  was  placed on  protection of grading and 
earnings  (see Muller-Jentsch 1979  and  Clegg  1979).  The 
quality of work  became  a  focus  of bargaining as well  as  its 
rewards.  As  technology  changed skills management  sought  to 
introduce  new  working practices providing greater 
flexibility among  the  workforce.  The  negative effects of 
de-skilling had,  as  far as  the  trade  unions  were  concerned, 
to be  offset by  opportunities  to enhance  other skills and 
competence  over a  range of jobs - job content became  a  key 
issue  (two  interesting cases are  the  new  agreements at 
Volkswagen  -·see Hildebrandt 1981- and  Cadbury  Bourneville 
- see  IRRR  No.266  1982).  Technology  was  providing the 
fulcrum  for changing working practices and  bargaining 
priorities.  The  need  to safeguard jobs and  job content 
were  assuming  increasing importance  prior to the 
introduction of more  sophisticated inrormation  technology 
equipment. 
Trade  union  power 
Trade union power  is a  nebulous  concept.  However,  at a 
certain level  the unions  in both Britain and  Germany  made 
advances  in the  1970s - a  process under  threat,  if not 
being reversed,  in the  1980s.  In both countries the 1970s 
witnessed an  increase  in strike activity,  albeit operating 
from  different base  levels.  There  was  a  growth of 
'unofficial'  disputes  in the early 1970s  and  in Britain the 
miners'  strike of 1974  precipitated a  change of government 
(although contrary to popular myth  it could not be  said to 
bring down  the government  - the  government  brought itself 
down  by  choosing to fight an  election on  the  issue). 
Allied to  a  growing militancy  was  a  rise in union 
membership  and  density.  Union  density  in Germany  grew  from 
30.0%  in 1969  to 34.4%  in 1974  and  has  expanded steadily 
since;  whilst in Britain density has  risen from  44%  in 1968 
to  56%  in 1979.  The  British growth  has  been  aided by  the 
extension of the  closed  shop  - closed shop  agreements are 
illegal in West  Germany.  The  recession has  caused  the 
growth of union membership  to be  reversed  in the 1980s  and 
anti-closed shop  legislation in Britain could well 
accelerate that process.  As  a  generalisation trade union 
strength and bargaining power  is considerably less in both 
Britain and  West  Germany  in the  1980s  than it was  in  tl1e 
1970s.  Perhaps  more  important is the  fact that trade 
unions  recognise  this. to be  so. -47-
4.2.4  White-collar unionism 
Both countries have  seen  a  marked  growth  in white-collar 
trade unionism over  the past decade.  One  of the 
consequences of this has  been  a  rise in female  trade 
unionists  {in Germany  there  was  a  rise from  16.7% in 1971 
to 20.3%  in 1980,  and  in Britain female  trade unionists 
grew  from  22%  in 1966  to  29%  in 1976).  White  collar unions 
are playing an  increasingly influential role in national 
trade union federations  (the  TUC  and  DGB)  and  in many  cases 
represent the  'front line'  in negotiating and handling 
technological change.  Office  technology is at the 
forefront of the  information  technology  revolution and 
whilst technological  change  may  well assist union growth. 
as the  largely non-unionised white-collar sector seeks 
greater job protection,  it will  also provide  a  major test 
tor the white-collar unions.  Precedents set in the white-
collar sector could well  influen~e bargaining in 
manufacturing industry,  whereas hitherto the white collar 
unions have  largely developed  under  the wing  of their 
bigger and  stronger manual  counterparts. 
Declining ecohomic  fortunes,  the extension of bargaining in 
the face of technological change,  perceptions of trade 
union power  and  the growth of white-collar trade unionism, 
have all played  important roles  in the  development of a 
trade union  approach  to new  information  technology;  they 
have both moulded  the strategy and  had  an  important 
influence  on  trade union  behaviour.  The  report will  now 
turn  to an  examination of the strategies pursued by  the 
British and  German  trade union  movements  in regard  to this 
issue. 
Trade  union strategies 
Trade  union strategies will be  exar..ined with  reference to four 
areas:  the overall approach  (policy);  perceived priorities 
{propaganda) ;  the  nature of the st!"ategy  {protection) ;  and  the 
development of the strategy by  indLvidual  unions  (practice).  The 
approach  can  be  characterised as being based on  "5 Ps"  - the 
missing  'P'  is prayer,  "pray  for  the return of a  friendly 
government". 
4.3.1  Policy 
The  overall strategies pursued by  the  TUC  and  the  DGB  are 
strikingly similar.  The  TUC  developed its appraoch  in the 
1970s.  By  the  time it came  to fruition in the  form  of an 
Interim Report  in April  1979  the  Labour Party was  in 
government  and  the stragey envisaged  a  close co-operation 
between  trade  unions  and  government  in tackling new 
technology as part of an  overall  'industrial strategy'  - an 
essential element of which  was  an  extension of "industrial 
democracy".  The  following month  the  Labour  Government  was 
defeated at the polls and  was  replaced by  a  Conservative 
administration elected on  a  platform of limiting the power 
of trade unions.  The  TUC's  final report on new  technology, 
which  appeared  in September 1979  {TUC  1979),  therefore, 
placed considerably more  emphasis  on  collective bargaining. 
However,  the basic trade union  approach  to new  technology 
was  not altered.  As  TUC  General Secetary,. Len  Murray,  put 
it: -48-
"The  impact of the  new  technology  on  employment  in  the 
1980s is one  of the greatest challenges facing us.  It 
is a  challenge facing not only trade unions,  but our 
industry and society as  a  whole.  The  issues  involved 
are  complex.  But  in some  respects our message  is a 
simple  one.  It is not just a  question of accepting the 
new  technology or fighting it.  The  issue is how  we  can 
maximise  its benefits and  minimise its costs,  and 
ensure that its benefits are equitably shared."  (TUC 
1979,  p.S). 
The  TUC  laid emphasis  on  the  trade union movement  adopting 
a  "positive policy"  on  the  question and  argued the case for 
a  "range of policies to help workers  adapt  in order to 
benefit from  the  new  opportunities for  improved  living 
standards and  increased leisure offered by  the  new 
technology"  (TUC  1979,  p.9).  At  work-place  level  the  TUC 
recommended  the signing of "new  technology  agreements" 
(NTAs)  and  provided a  10-point  'checklist'  of suggested 
practice: 
1.  basic principles - agreements  following consultation 
and negotiations,  and  the use of  'status quo' 
provi-sions 
2.  union organisation - joint machinery  embracing all 
unions  in the  company 
3.  information - regular disclosure of information, 
monitoring by  experts  and  time-off for training 
4.  employment  and  output - use  technology  to  increase 
production and  not to reduce manning,  seek 
guaranteed job security and  redeployment rather than 
redundancies 
5.  retraining - mutually  agreed  training and retraining 
schemes 
6.  hours of work  - negotiate shorter hours  and 
eliminate systematic overtime 
7.  distribution of benefits - rewards  for  new  skills 
but fair distribution of benefits to all the 
workforce 
8.  control over work  - monitor  job  design and  work 
organisation to enhance  rather  than  decrease  job 
satisfaction 
9.  health and  safety - monitor hazards  from  new 
processes,  machines  and  equipment 
10.  review progress - joint trade union/management  teams 
to study  the effects of introducing and  operating 
new  technology. -49-
The  emphasis  on  work-place bargaining and  the signing of 
NTAs  did not deter  the  TUC  from  continuing to argue  the 
case for co-operation with government.  In its 1980 
Economic  Review  (TUC  1980d,  p.37)  it urged the 
establishment of a  tripartite  (government/employers  (CBI)/ 
trade unions  (TUC))  national  agreement  on  new  technology 
(see also TUC  1980c),  which  was  essentially to be  a  •code 
of practice'  for  companies  introducing new  technology.  The 
joint trade  union/management  approach  favoured  by  the  TUC 
at work-place  level  wa~ extended  to cover all levels of the 
enterprise.  The  TUC  firmly believed that an extension of 
'industrial democracy'  was  essential to the successful 
introduction and  operation of new  technology,  despite the 
inter and  intra-union problems  caused by  the publication of 
the Bullock Report a  few  years earlier which  argued for  a 
legislative approach to place workers  onto the main  boards 
of all large companies.  The  TUC  stated that  :  "·.agreement 
on  the  introduction of new  technology  can extend the area 
of joint decision-taking within  industry  ••  Management  of 
change  must  be  on  the basis of the full participation of 
those being affected in the  formulation  and  implementation 
of decisions ••• at all levels of an  organisation"  {TUC 
1980d,  p.37). 
Since 1980  as unemployment  has  dramatically  increased,  the 
TUC  has  become  increasingly cautious about  the role of 
government and  worker participation in technological 
change.  The  CBI's refusal to endorse  a  joint statement 
about new  technology  agreements  and  increasingly strained 
relations with the Government  no  doubt contributed to this 
mood.  Nevertheless,  however  remote tripartite agreements 
at national  level  and  joint decision-making at company 
level appear  in the present climate,  they remain  integral 
parts of long-term strategic planning  {see  TUC/LP  1982}. 
In Germany  the  DGB  has  adopted  a  similar strategic 
approach.  It has also viewed  existing collective 
agreements  as  inadequate  to the  task of coping with  new 
technology  (Janssen  1980,  p.251)  and  has  argued the  case 
for  the signing of "rationalisation protection agreements" 
(RPAs)  along similar lines to British NTAs.  The  basic  aim 
of RPAs  would  be  the prctection of jobs  and  job content 
(see  HBV  1981;  Scheibe-Lange  1980,  p.483  and  Volkmar  1980, 
p.423).  Legal  rights of information disclosure would  be 
extended - one  idea being a  compulsory  six-month report 
from  management  to the works  council  concerning long-term 
plans to  introduce technological  change  {cf.  HBV  1981),  an 
idea  (cf.  the  'Vredeling•  proposals}  also being given 
serious consideration at European  Community  level as far as 
multi-national corporations are concerned.  The  German 
unions have  placed strong emphasis  on  the  need  for  fUrther 
education  and  training and  workforce  influence over  job 
content.  It has been  argued  that "minimum  operation times" 
and  "minimum  job content"  agreements  should be  signed to 
prevent work  intensification and de-skilling arising from 
information technology  (Janssen 1980,  p.255).  This  is a 
particular concern  in regard to office work  where,  as  there 
is little or no  piecework or bonus  payment  systems,  the 
bargaining role of works  council  has  been minimal  or non-
existent  (HBV  1978a).  Information  technology  should be 
used to broaden skills m1d  provide  more  ·meaningful  work 
(OTV  1978). 4.3.2 
-50-
The  German  wtions are aware,  as are  their British 
counterparts,  that they  have  had little influence over  the 
planning and  introduction of new  technology.  Co-
determination at company  level  does not appear to have 
enabled works  councils at shopfloor level  to be  any  the 
better informed about company  long-term plans for  the 
introduction and operation of new  technology than their 
British counterparts who  do  not have  trade union 
representation at board level.  The  largest German  union, 
the Metalworkers'  Union,  IG  Metal!,  has become  increasingly 
concerned about  the lack of information from  the  top and 
the establishment of an "information gap"  between  employers 
and  trade union representatives at work-place  level.  IG 
Metal! has argued that 
"Without sufficient knowledge  of the  systems used and 
without the same  access to the data stored,  the  works 
council will be  unable to carry out their legal duties 
or take  advantage of their legal rights.  The 
information gap  which  has widened  enormously  and  the 
communications  facilities that have  been installed make 
it impossible  for  the works  council  to check whether 
the employer is adhering to the  law  or to collective 
agreements.  In our experience the  employer often does 
not do  the latter.  In  future  IG  Metall  must  do  more 
than investigate the effects of new  information and 
communications  technologies on  the workforce.  Beyond 
the  level of the workplace  any  further widening of the 
information gap will bring serious disadvantage to IG 
Metall  : 
it will become  increasingly difficuit to verify the 
employers'  arguments 
- employers•  srategies which  are  drawn  up  by  their 
central co-ordinating bodies and  which  are put  into 
effect at the  level of the workplace  will  remain 
increasingly concealed 
by  further developing such strategies employers  find 
it easier to undermine  union action by  transferring 
production overseas."  (IG  Metal!  1980a) 
The  centralised formal  bargaining system  in West  Germany 
does  not appear to get over  the  problem of the 
implementation at workplace  level of strategic decisions 
which  have  been  taken elsewhere  any better than the 
decentralised informal system operating in Britain.  Due  to 
the different structures the German  trade union solution is 
to seek industry-wide  RPAs  and  the British to seek 
company-wide  NTAs,  but the strategy and  its constituent 
parts remain very similar. 
Propaganda 
NTAs  and  RPAs  represent  'ideal'  solutions.  Neither trade 
union movement  expects  the granting of every one of the 
stipulated provisions.  In defining its strategy, 4.3.3 
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therefore,  priorities have  to be  accorded.  Both  the  TUC 
and  the  DGB  appear to have  placed priority on  the reduction 
of working hours  through  the  shorter working week  (the 35-
hour week  being the  immediate  target of both federations), 
longer holidays,  sabbaticals and  early retirement.  The  TUC 
has  conducted a  major  educational  campaign  on  shortening 
hours  and  reducing overtime  (the latter being a 
particularly  •British disease')  and  a  number  of industry-
wide  and  company-wide  successes have  been  recorded  in  terms 
of the shorter workig week.  However,  despite a  massive 
rise in unemployment  levels over  the past three years, 
overtime  levels  among  manual  workers  in manufacturing 
industry remain  inordinately high.  The  TUC  remains  an 
educational  and  propaganda organisation with little or no 
control over the practices of its affiliated unions  and, 
equally,  its affiliated unions  have  often very little 
control over the bargains struck and  practices condoned  by 
their representatives at shopfloor level.  The  inability of 
meaningful  progress to be  made  on  shortening the actual 
number  of hours  worked  through  free collective bargaining 
has  forced  the  TUC  to give serious consideration to the 
legislative alternative both  in regard to the working  week 
and  maximum  overtime.  However,  the  tendency at shopfloor 
level for  lengthening the  working  day  in order to produce  a 
four-day  week  and  longer blocks of leisure  time  has 
officially been  discouraged - needless  to say the practice 
is spreading. 
The  priority given to the shorter working week  as  a 
response  to new  technology  appears  perverse.  It is very 
difficult to negotiate  in  times  of economic  recession,  its 
impact on  jobs  in knocking  one  or  two  hours  off the working 
week  is minimal,  it does  not tackle overtime  and  does 
little to address itself to new  technology.  It has  assumed 
symbolic  importance at national  level while  the real issues 
- job replacement,  job substitution and  job content - have 
been left largely to be  sorted out by  work-place bargaining 
units whose  position in regard to these matters is 
invariably weak. 
Protection 
The  national  trade union  federations  have  established 
guidelines  on  'best practice•,  addressed themselves  to 
immediate priorities and  sought to influence government, 
employers  and  their own  affiliated organisations on  policy 
changes necessitated by  information technology.  In  so 
doing  they have  been aware  of their limitations in putting 
policy into practice and  have  assumed  a  largely educational 
role.  In  formulating  a  strategy aimed  at job protection 
both have  come  to recognise  the  inadequacy of their own 
bargaining and  industiral relations•  systems  in dealing 
with technological  change.  However,  it is easier to 
recognise  a  fault than  to remedy  it.  What  is interesting, 
given  the criticisms levelled at their respective systems, 
is that there is a  shared belief that new  technology can 
only be  adequately handled at the  workplace  by  means  of 
some  form  of joint control.  In Britain,  operating from 4.3.4 
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an  'adversarial'  base,  this has meant  strengthening joint 
trade union committees  (or JUCs  as  they are referred to  -
see  TUC/LP  1982),  building on  joint consultation and  joint 
trade union/management  arrangements,  seeking greater 
participation in company  decision-making processes  (up  to 
and  including board  level)  and  generally expanding 
information,  consultation and  representation rights.  These 
workplace  provisions  to be  supported by  a  tripartite 
planning framework  and  changes  to company  law.  The  key 
element is increasing trade union  involvement and 
participation by  means  of legislation.  It is a  clear 
recognition that  •voluntarism'  does  not provide  the  answers 
to technological  change.  In Germany,  operating from  a 
•co-operative'  base,  the  strategy has not been  a  retreat 
from  legalism but one  of strengthening its provisions.  It 
is a  strategy of pursuing joint control  by  building on  what 
exists,  increasing the  powers  of works  councils and 
obtaining further  information rights to exercise greater 
control  through co-determination. 
In both Britain and  Germany  the  trade unions  have 
recognised that to effectively pursue  a  policy of job 
protection greater partcipation is required in strategic 
decision-making.  Workplace  bargaining units,  however 
strong on  certain issues,  are  largely  inadequate  to the 
task of bargaining technological change.  The  British and 
German  solutions are not  identical but they  do  point to a 
desire to strengthen bargaining power  through  an  increasing 
institutionalisation of trade unions  into decision-making 
processes with  employers  and  the state,  to win  new  'rights• 
and  to take  on  new  'responsibilities•. 
Practice 
Although  the national strategies developed by  the  TUC  and 
DGB  are  approved without dissent by  their affiliated 
organisations,  this does  not mean  that individual  unions 
have  adopted similar approaches  to  the  introduction and 
handling of new  technology.  A number  of differences of 
approach  and  emphasis  can be  identified and  require 
elaboration. 
Differences of approach are  more  noticeable  in Britain due 
to its diverse trade union structure.  Most  trade unions 
have  taken their lead from  the  TUC  and  have  devised their 
own  "checklists for negotiators"  (TUC  1979,  pp.64-71  and 
NUJ  1980,  pp.62-65)  or new  technology  "model  agreements" 
(APEX  1980,  pp.  56-60;  AUEW  (TASS)  1978,  pp.15-16;  BIFU 
1982,  pp.26-27;  EEPTU  1981,  pp.9-11;  GMWU  1980,  pp.46-52 
and  NALGO  1980,  pp.31-35),  There  is no  dissension  from  TUC 
policy of accepting new  technology or  from  the  major 
components  of new  technology bargaining - consultation, 
information,  no  compulsory  redundancies,  no  loss of 
earnings,  training and  retraining,  shorter hours,  health 
and  safety provisions and  joint monitoring.  However, 
within these broad guidelines  there  does exist perceptible 
differences of approach  and  attitude which  have  undoubted 
industrial relations consequences.  It has  been argued that 
there are  four potential  shopfloor approaches  to new 
technology - total opposition,  concerted opposition, -53-
bargained acceptance  and  total acceptance  (Francis and 
Willman  1980,  p.l8).  At  national level there has  only been 
one  approach  - 'bargained acceptance'  - but within it the 
emphasis  has differed to a  considerable degree.  The  study 
distinguishes between  three varieties of  'bargained 
acceptance'  - hard-line,  flexible  and  positive 
encouragement. 
Hard-line 
The  unions  most  directly affected by  new  technology  have 
tended  to  adopt this approach  in negotiating change. 
Typical  examples  are the NGA's  emphasis  on  "job property 
rights
11  in the printing industry,  ACTT's  emphasis  on  job 
security provisions in regard to electronic news  gathering 
equipment,  and  formal  agreements  over a  range of issues 
sought by  BIFU  and  the Civil Service unions prior to the 
approval of new  technology.  Trade  unions  have  either 
threatened or taken  industrial action to block the 
introduction of new  technology until satifactory agreement 
is reached.  Trade unions have  not rejected the  technology 
outright only  the manner  and  terms of its operation. 
Where  agreement has not been  reached  they have  been 
prepared to take  industrial action to obtain a  satisfactory 
agreement. 
Flexible 
A flexible approach  is one  where  new  technology has been 
negotiated and  introduced without the threat of industrial 
action.  This  is by  far and  away  the most  typical approach 
and  experience.  Most  unions  have  been  prepared to 
compromise  on  their  'best practice'  when  negotiating 
technological change,  particularly after an  agreement on  no 
compulsory  redundancies has been obtained.  The  white-
collar union  APEX  perhaps best typifies this approach. 
APEX  have  been  in the forefront of new  technology 
bargaining but have  seldom  had  cause to adopt  a  'hard-line 
approach'.  This  has also generally been the  experience of 
other white collar unions  such as  ASTMS,  NALGO  and  the 
CPSA. 
Positive encouragement 
Trade  unions  caught  in  the front line of new  information 
technology  have  either put up  temporary resistance  ('hard-
line approach')  or tried to sway  with  the wind  ('flexible 
approach').  Those  largely unaffected to date  (such as 
major general unions - TGWU  and  GMWU)  have  tended  to 
prepare their defences  and  await developments.  Certain 
unions,  however,  have  positively welcomed  the  introduction 
of new  technology and  have  pursued a  policy of active 
encouragement.  A clear example  of this approach is that 
pursued by  the  EEPTU  - the  POEU  has  pursued it to a  lesser 
degree.  The  EEPTU  is not merely wishing to react to change 
but sees itself as having "no  option other than actively to 
foster  and  support the  introduction of new  microelectronic 
technology"  (EEPTU  1981,  p.l).  It believes that 
"maintenance electricians have  a  heaven-sent opportunity to 
improve  their position considerably in comparison with the -54-
more  traditional crafts"  (EEPTU  1981,  p.S)  and  that this 
will "mean  breaking away  from  the common  craft rate"  (p.7). 
The  EEPTU  undoubtedly sees information technology as  a 
means  of pursuing the relative interests of its own 
membership  in comparison with other sections of the 
workforce. 
The  EEPTU's  policy of up-grading its members  as a 
consequence of new  technology has been  termed  a 
"bridgehead"  approach  in contrast with  the  "broadfront" 
strategy,  no  new  grades,  recommended  by  the  TUC  (Bamber 
1980,  p.l4).  However,  whilst the  TUC  is aware  of workforce 
'polarisation'  as  a  consequence of new  technology,  it also 
believes in the rewarding of additional skills and  that 
these additional skills "should be  taken  into account in 
assessing  ••  pay  grades"  and,  further,  that where  "job 
evaluation systems exist they  may  need  to be  redesigned to 
reflect changes  in skill requirements"  (TUC  1979,  p.69). 
The  EEPTU  may  be  more  forceful  in pursuit of re-grading 
than other uhions but it is difficult to argue that in 
doing so it is in breach of any  accepted strategy let alone 
policy.  Some  general unions  would  not wish  small  groups of 
craftsmen  to extravagantly exploit new  technology for their 
own  ends,  but there is little evidence - and  none  this 
study could find  - of trade union objections in principle 
to higher rewards  for new  skills.  In fact,  all the 
evidence among  craft and  non-craft unions  alike points to 
an acceptance of re-grading consequent upon  a  major 
introduction of new  technology. 
Trade  union strategies appear to differ,  as  one  might 
expect,  in proportion to the  degree of effect which  the new 
technology  has  upon  the membership.  Unions  which  see their 
membership  being radically affected,  like the  NGA,  seek to 
drive a  hard bargain;  whilst those who  see opportunities 
for advancement,  like the  EEPTU,  seek to exploit it.  The 
white collar unions,  which  foresee  a  major  long-term 
impact,  are  eager to lay down  the  ground rules for  fUture 
negotiations as well  as  to safeguard the short-term 
interests of their membership.  For most  unions  the 
serious business of new  technology bargaining is yet to 
begin. 
In  Germany  the  industrial union structure has  operated to 
prevent  the pursuit of sectional interests.  The  pursuit of 
craft interests,  whether it be  the preservation of the  NGA 
or  the elevation of the EEPTU,  has  been  largely subsumed 
within  the union structure.  What  has  happened,  and  this 
has  also been  largely true of Britain,  is that the  pace of 
trade union strategies has  been set by  the white-collar 
unions.  To  a  considerable degree  the white-collar unions 
have  defined the overall trade union strategy on  new 
technology:  on  most matters this would  be  rare.  In Germany 
it has  been the public service,  transport and  communication 
workers  (  OTV)  and  the  commerce ,  bank  and  insurance workers 
(HBV)  who  have  been  in the forefront of new  technology 
bargaining.  It is these strategies -4.4 
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'bargained acceptance'  through  RPAs  and  NTAs  - which  will 
be  the first to be  tested and  on  their success or the  lack 
of it much  will depend.  If the  OTV  and  HBV  in Germany,  and 
BIFU  and  the Civil Service unions  in Britain, fail  to get 
the kind of industry-wide agreements  they are seeking on 
new  technology  then tactics may  be  changed  and  different 
precedents established.  At  the moment  it would  appear that 
there is still quite a  bit of mileage left within the 
present approach,  in both countries,  before a  change  of 
direction is likely to be  called for. 
Trade  union handling of technological  change 
The  report has described how  awareness of the radical 
nature of information technology has  led to the development 
of specific trade union responses  and strategies.  Detailed 
work  in these areas,  even for  those unions with the 
greatest degree  of awareness,  has  largely been the product 
of the last five years.  The  attempt to translate policy 
into  practic~.  through bargaining and  the establishment of 
NTAs  and  RPAs,  has  had  a  shorter life-span.  Trade  union 
assessments of these policies are,  therefore,  in their 
infancy.  Most  trade unions are too busy trying to 
establish the ground rules for  technology bargaining to 
attempt an  analysis of the  lessons to be drawn  from  current 
practice.  The  evidence on  which  an  assessment of 
technology bargaining could be  based is limited and, 
because it is limited,  any  conclusions drawn  would 
necessarily be  partial.  However,  from  the  evidence which 
is available certain tentative conclusions may  be  drawn. 
Experience of new  technology bargaining is insufficient for 
definite conclusions as  to its impact  on  industrial 
relations to be  made  but sufficient for describing possible 
developments.  Changes  or potential changes  to industrial 
relations can  be analysed in a  number  of areas. 
4.4.1  Bargaining 
As  part of the British study a  detailed analysis was 
made  of 30  •new  technology agreements'.  The  trade 
unions  involved were  APEX  (9),  ASTMS  (6),  NUJ  (4), 
NALGO  (3},  CPSA  (1),  GMWU  (1),  TGWU  (1)  and  there 
were  five  agreements covering a  number  of unions 
(three of which  involved  APEX  and  two  of which 
involved ASTMS).  The  sample  does  not claim to be 
representative and it has also to be  borne  in mind 
that a  lot of new  technology bargaining involves 
manpower  and  productivity  ag~eements not packaged as 
a  NTA.  It also needs stating that a  written 
agreement can  in practice hide more  than it reveals. 
Nevertheless  from  an  analysis of the  30 agreementq 
the following observations can be  made: 
•  new  technology agreements  are few  in number  and 









the  NTAs  were  very  limited in coverage -
usually applying to a  specific piece or pieces 
of equipment  (mainly  WPs  and  VDUs)  :  an 
exception was  an  agreement which  defined new 
technology as "the introduction of new  equipment 
or new  systems  of working  which  may 
significantly change  the way  in which  tasks are 
performed" 
most  of the  agreements  were  concerned with four 
main  issues 
1.  procedures - either  'status quo•  (no  change 
without agreement)  or agreement  to 
consult 
information 
joint review and  /or monitoring 
2.  health and  safety 
3.  training and retraining 
4.  job protection - usually amounting  to an 
agreement  for no  involuntary redundancy  as  a 
consequence  of new  technology  (although a 
number  of agreements  did assume  job loss) 
other concerns to figure  in  the  agreements were: 
regrading where  new  skills were  acquired 
not to use  new  technology to monitor or 
regulate work  performance 
redeployment provisions 
•trial periods'  for using the equipment prior 
to agreement 
the  NTAs  did not cover,  as  a  rule,  benefits 
accruing from  new  technology in terms of wages, 
bonuses  or hours;  these matters were  left to 
other bargaining arrangements  and  procedures 
most  NTAs  endeavoured to cover the ground laid 
down  by  the TUC's  10-point  'checklist'  but this 
usually resulted in generalised statements of 
intent rather than specific provisions 
most  NTAs  were  worded  in such a  way  that their 
value depended  a  great deal  on  interpretation 
the  NTAs  were  mainly sectoral - referring to a 
particular site or to particular elements of the 
workforce. -57-
The  new  technology agreements  studied represented 
significant steps for a  small number  of workers  in 
protecting themselves -aainst •technological 
unemployment'  and  provided their unions with certain 
levers to ~e in the bargaining process.  They  did 
not represent a  systematic approach to employment, 
output and  rewards.  They  were  an  adjunct to the 
consultation and  bargaining process rather than a 
major constitutent part.  Their true merit could 
only be  judged from  a  study of how  the agreement 
operated in practice and  what  changes,  if any,  it 
had  inaugurated.  The  signing of an  NTA  represented 
an  approach to a  problem rather than its solution. 
The  lack of up-take of NTAs  by  non-white-collar 
unions and  the inability to extend coverage to 
company-wide,  industry-wide or national agreements. 
casts serious doubts on  their relevance to the trade 
union movement  as a  whole.  Undoubtedly  the white-
collar unions will continue to pursue the tactic as 
NTAs.not  only benefit the membership  but they 
benefit the union as well.  They  provide status and 
recognition for the union  in areas where  this has 
often proved difficult to achieve.  Blue-collar 
adoption of NTAs  is less certain. 
Whether  NTAs  make  a  significant impact on  job 
regulation is less important than the issues they 
raise.  Both  in Britain and  in Germany  there is a 
clear movement  towards  bargaining job protection and 
job security  (and  in other countries as well -
witness the growth of "concession bargainina"  in· the 
United States) •  This  trend is apparent whether it 
is linked to new  technology or not.  The  question 
basically revolves around whether it is best to 
attempt to use  new  technolou bargaining to obtain 
job protection or whether this approach  is too 
restrictive and  job protection is better secured by 
other aore conventional means.  To  date experience 
would  suggest that neither method  is particularly 
successful.  The  true impact of new  technology on 
bargaining will only be  judged when  more  detailed 
work  is carried out into those few  areas where  it 
has so far intruded and,  more  importantly,  when 
major  new  technolo&Y  agreements - such as those 
proposed by  BIFU,  the Civil Service unions,  HBV  and 
OTV  - have  been  introduced,  monitored and  their 




Obtaining adequate  infor~ation on  company  investment 
policies and manpower  planning is seen as a  serious problem 
by  the trade union movements  in both countries.  There  is 
widespread criticism of existing consultation and 
informatic-·  ryrovisions not for what  they are but for what 
they are ,,ot i.e.  they exclude major  planning and  invesment 
decisions.  There  are arguments  which  favour  a  legislative 
approach  such as  the recent  'Vredeling proposals'  before 
the European  Commission  or the Swedish Joint Regulation in 
Working  Life Act  which  places a  responsibility on  employers 
to negotiate with  a  trade union before deciding on 
important changes at the workplace.  There  are also 
arguments  in favour of a  voluntary approach such as the 
TUC-CBI  joint •code  of practice',  which  failed to be 
ratified,  or the Norwegian  agreement between  the employers' 
and  trade union federation which  seeks to regulate new 
technology on  a  voluntary basis.  The  Norwegian  agreement 
specifies  ad~quate disclosure of information,  the training 
of trade union representatives  (including paid time-off and 
the appointment of  •  data stewards' )  and  encourages the 
parties to make  local agreements. 
It is clear that both in Britain and  Germany  existing 
voluntary agreements and  legislative provisions do  not 
measure  up  to those  in Scandinavia.  The  search for better 
provisions will undoubtedly continua and  could have 
industrial relations'  consequences. 
Participation 
The  trade union  response to new  technology has served to 
reinforce trends which  were  already discernible in the 
British and  German  trade union movements  and  their 
respective industrial relations'  systems  : 
a)  In Germany  there is a  desire to strengthen co-
determination and  the legislative rights which  go  with 
it.  Due  to the  lack of movement  at national level and 
trade union dissatisfaction with the workings  of the 
labour courts,  there has been  a  movement  to strengthen 
the  'informal'  system.  ~orks councils are assuming more 
responsibility in regard to wage  bargaining,  including 
the benefits of new  technology,  and  seeking to use  their 
statutory rights to exercise more  control over the 
introduction and  operation of new  technology. 
Bargaining is becoming  more  decentralised and greater 
authority is being vested in bargaining units at company 
and  plant level. 
b)  In Britain there has been  a  growth  in joint consultation 
and,  whilst falling short of joint decision-making,  new 
technology has fostered this development.  The  rise of 
single-employer bargaining has also assisted the 
development of consultative machinery.  Movement  towards 
a  more  formal  participative framework  is encouraged by 
the trade unions  and  has met  with a  certain positive 
response  in some  companies  - in other areas, (5) 
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particularly the nationalised industries  (BL,  British 
Ste~l and British Rail),  the process has been reversed. 
Short of legislation no  clear pattern is likely to 
emerge.  However,  where  new  technology does  lead to the 
establishment of joint management  and  trade union 
machinery,  it may  well  lead to the encouragement of 
wider  terms of reference.  The  future of joint 
consultation may  well rest on  its ability to activate 
'joint problem solving'  in meaningful decision-making 
areas. 
4.4.4  Demarcation and  skills 
In Britain new  technology nas caused and will cause 
demarcation problems.  As  skills change  and  technology 
narrows the gap  and  blurs the differences between  white-
collar and  blue-collar work  so problems arise.  The 
printing and  manufacturing sectors have already experienced 
demarcation problems arising from  the introduction of new 
technology.  Only  the rationalisation of trade union 
structures or the establishment of joint negotiating 
machinery  can effectively minimise this area of potential 
conflict.  The  evidence would  suggest that both are 
proceeding very slowly. 
4.4.5  Benefits 
The  extraction of benefits from  new  technology and  their 
distribution are areas of vital concern to the trade 
unions.  At  present,  due  to the comparative newness  of 
technology bargaining and  slowness of information 
technology  take-up  (particularly in Britain), little firm 
evidence is av~ilable.  However,  what  evidence there is 
suggest that both the British and  German  trade unions have 
so far been singularly unsuccessful  in reducing working 
hours as  a  consequence  of new  technology.  In Britain, 
despite a  near tripling of unemployment  over the past three 
years,  there has  been  no  movement  at all in reducing the 
amount  of overtime  being worked.  The  trade unions'  ability 
to  'deliver•  on  hours  has  been called into question and  the 
consequence  has been  a  rise in support for  a  legislative 
approach. 
The  exclusion of pay  and  hours  from  most  NTAs  and 
discussions on  new  technology raises the question of 
whether traditonal collective bargaining and  new  technology 
bargaining can be  successfully divorced.  The  evidence 
suggests that they can,  but only at the cost of under-
playing the  importance of new  information technology to the 
production process.  New  technology is primarily linked to 
jobs rather than rewards.  However,  trade unions  like the 
EEPTU  have  correctly perceived that rewards  are a  major 
issue.  The  pressure to create stronger links between 
technology  and  rewards will increase as the diffusion of 
new  technology becomes  more  rapid.  The  impact this will 
have  9n  the respective industrial relations'  systems is 
impossible  to predict. -60-
4.4.6  Job  security 
The  evidence to date regarding the bargaining an~ handling 
of new  information technology suggests that the trade 
unions main  concern has been with job security.  The 
primary purpose behind NTAs  and  RPAs  has been the 
establishment of job protection;  all other considerations 
have  been  secondary.  The  demand  for  job security led to 
the  abandonment  of the Council  of Civil Service Unions• 
two-year  'interim agreement'  on  new  technology signed with 
the government  (the employers)  in March  1982  - the 
agreement did not guarantee  •no  job loss•.  Equally the 
major  stumbling block to industry-wide new  technology 
agreements  in both Britain and  Germany  has been trade union 
insistance on  strong job protection guarantees.  It is 
unlikely that the  demand  for greater job security will  have 
radical structural effects on  industrial relations in the 
two  countries but it will undoubtedly  influence the nature 
of the  job regulation debate. 
4.4.7  Trade  union organisation 
It is claer from  the study that the German  trade unions 
ought organisationally to be better equipped to handle 
technological change  than their British counterparts; it is 
less than clear that they are. 
The  German  trade union movement  has  infinitely superior 
research and  education resources  than the British trade 
union movement  (a)  because of the state-supported legal. 
structure of rights and  responsibilities and  (b)  because 
German  trade unions allocate a  far greater proportion of 
their financial resources,  which  are in turn based on 
significantly higher membership  subscriptions,  on  education 
than British unions  see fit.  In the training of its full-
time  and  lay officials and  in the services it provides to 
the  trade union movement  in general,  these resources can 
only be  of undoubted benefit.  However,  in handling 
technological change,  the problems  presented were  common 
and  not ones which  could be  solved by  means  of a  greater 
allocation of resources. 
The  major  problem  facing trade unions in both countries was 
adapting bargaining mechanisms  to cope with  new  information 
technology.  It was  apparent that the "front-line" trade 
unions  (such as  APEX,  AUEW  (TASS),  ASTMS  and  BIFU  in 
B~itain, and  HBV  and  OTV  in West  Germany)  had  studied the 
subject in depth and built up  considerable expertise on 
asects of information technology which directly affected 
them.  Having  devised a  strategy to cope  with  technolog~cal 
change,  the difficulty was  in implementing it through 
existing bargaining structures.  In Germany  centralised 
bargaining provided an  opportunity to secure wide-ranging 
agreements but employer opposition at regional and  industry 
levels meant  that bargaining over technological change  was 
pushed  down  to work-place  level.  In Britain more 
decentralised bargaining mechanisms  meant  that new -61-
technology was  from  the outset being primarily tackled by 
company  or plant bargaining units.  In both countries the 
brunt of new  technology bargaining was  being tackled at 
shopfloor level through units ill-equipped to deal with the 
wider  ramifications of the subject. 
Common  organisational problems at the workplace were 
multi-plant companies  through which  it was  difficult for 
lay trade union representatives to develop a  co-ordinated 
strategy,  the fact that new  technology usually initially 
only affected a  section of the workforce  (which often 
resulted in a  fragmented  approach  in Britain with attendant 
demarcation and  sectional problems  and  in Germany  led to 
the  problem  being under-played as it only affected a 
minority of the workforce),  the  piecemeal nature of the 
introduction of new  technology,  lack of involvement in the 
planning process,  inadequate  information,  limitations on 
the  scope  of bargaining (the need  for a  company-wide, 
industry-wide or national  agreement prior to local 
agreements),  and  insufficient trade union back-up 
(research,  training and  education)  for  lay representatives 
(a far greater problem  in Britain). 
New  technology undoubtedly exposed  the  inadequacy of 
existing bargaining structures.  Because at this stage new 
technology bargaining was  centred on  the workplace,  the 
overall industrial relations frameworks  ('legalistic'  and 
'voluntaristic') had iittle influence on  developments. 
Until satisfactory national or major  agreements  are 
concluded,  the  onus  of new  technology bargaining will 
continue to fall on  workplace  trade union representatives 
and  will suffer from  the weaknesses  which  that implies. 
Collective bargaining stuctures combine  in both countries 
to push  new  technology  to the peripheries of job 
regulation. 
The  structural problems  facing trade unionists with new 
technology are recognised by  those  unions who  are 
intimately involved with  the  subject.  The  need  for 
national agreements,  guidelines or even  codes  of practice 
has  been recognised by  both  the  TUC  and  the  DGB  and  a 
number  of their constitutent unions  are trying to obtain 
such  agreements  in their own  sectors  (e.g.  BIFU  and  the 
Civil Service unions  in Britain and  HBV  and  OTV  in 
Germany),  so  far without success.  Significant 
breakthroughs at a  higher  level might well  change  the 
character of new  technology bargaining,  although many  of 
the workplace  problems  will remain. 
The  German  participative structure,  with trade union 
representatives sitting on  all major  company  boards,  should 
provide  a  better framework  for handling technological 
change.  However,  the evidence from  this study points to 
the fact that in regard to new  technology  the average works 
council  is just as removed  from  company  strategic 
decision-making as is the average  shop  stewards committee. 
The  problem  is that works  councils and  shop  stewards 
committees  are having to cope  with  the  introduction and 
operation of new  technology when  they  were  not designed for 
that purpose  and  hence  are ill-equipped for  the  job.  As 
Eric Jacobs observed in a  wider  industrial relations 
context  : -62-
"But  however  they have  been  reformed  and  improved,  works 
councils and  shop  steward committees still ha~e a 
severely limited scope.  No  matter how  powerful, 
management still proposes  and  the workers' 
representatives still do  no  more  than oppose,  or at any 
rate argue.  At  best,  they may  have  some  limited rights 
of veto over management  actions that prejudice workers' 
standards or  emplo~nent.  But works  councils and  shop 
stewards'  committees  do  not influence policy at the 
formative stage;  they merely react to policy when  i~ 
has been made."  (Jacobs 1973,  p.67) 
If trade unions  are  to exercise real  influence over the 
introduction and  handling of new  information technology. 
then they will have  to obtain an  in-put into policy at the 
'formative stages•.  To  do  this would  require changes  in 
structure and  practice which,  in turn,  would  have  a  major 
impact  on  the prevailing state of industrial relations in 
the  two  countries.  There  are  few  signs of this being 
achieved.  F.ar  more  likely is that the  onus  will continue 
to fall on  works  councils,  shop  stewards'  committees  and 
other small bargaining units which  are largely inadequate 
to the task.  Trade union  influence over  the process of 
technological  change  will remain  small. (6) 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  following provisional  conclusions can be  drawn  from  the study 
5.1  Attitudes to  information technology 
There  was  a  high acceptance  on  the part of the workforce and  trade 
union representatives of new  technology  and  overwhelming evidence 
of .. positive" attitudes towards its introduction in all sectors 
which  were  studied.  There  was  shared agreement on  the relevance of 
the  "technology route"  as  a  means  for  company,  organisational and 
national  economic  growth.  Employment  prospects were  linked to 
taking that route not to its rejection or by-pass.  Acceptance of 
the  relevance of new  technology was  tempered by  concerns over jobs, 
job content and  job prospects;  but these concerns were  viewed in 
the context of a  process of adjustment not conflict. 
5.2  Information  technology  and  industrial relations'  frameworks 
5.2.1  It could not be  stated with any  certainty that the overall 
industrial relations'  frameworks,  'legalistic'  and 
•voluntaristic',  under  which  German  and  British trade union 
representatives operated,  affected either positively or 
negatively  the  way  in which  new  information technology was 
introduced and  handled.  Trade union representatives in 
both countries were  faced with similar problems  and  their 
success  in coping with  those  problems  had little to do with 
the  wider  industrial relations•  framework. 
5.2.2.  Equally it could not be  stated that national industrial 
relations'  practices and procedures differentially affected 
employers'  strategies in introducing new  technology or the 
way  in which  it was  handled.  Both  frameworks  appeared to 
provide  the  employers  with  flexibility as  to how  new 
technology was  to be  introduced and  handled. 
5.2.3  The  case studies and  supplementary evidence pointed to a 
wide  varity of practices and  experiences with new 
technology over which  the  industrial relations'  framework 
had little control.  The  introduct~on and  handling of new 
technology  owed  more  to  t.he  particulars of job regulation 
in the sectors examined  than to external factors such as 
the  law  or  freedom  to take  industrial action. 
5.3  Planning 
5.3.1 
5.3.2 
Workforce  or trade union participation in  the planning 
process was  as little in  evidence  in West  Germany  as it was 
in Britain.  This  was  not always  the  consequence of 
deliberate exclusion,  in come  cases it was  a  matter of 
choice.  Important factors were  the piecemeal nature of 
much  of the  introduction,  with co-ordinated planning policy 
difficult to perceive or locate,  employer opposition,  lack 
of information and  the  weakness  of bargaining positions and 
structures. 
The  legal regulations concerning disclosure of information 
in West  Germany  appeared,  in regard to  information 
technology,  to be  as weak  in practice at workplace  level as 
the British codes of practice.  The  studies show  heightened 
trade union  concern  in both countries to strengthen 
disclosure of information rights directly as  a  consequence 
of new  technology. -64-
5.4  Introduction of new  technology 
The  introduction of new  technology could be  characterised in a 
number  of ways,  the most  common  being "bargained imposition" and 
the attainment of a  "negotiated solution".  The  studies show  the 
latter to be  more  prevalent in the manufacturing sector and  the 
former  more  typical of the service sector.  The  process of 
introduction did not appear  to be  any  the more  participative in the 
German  studies than in the British.  Specific sectoral and  job 
regulation factors  were  of greater importance. 
5.5  Agreements 
5.5.1  Agreements  over new  technology  proved far more  difficult to 
obtain in the service sector than in the manufacturing 
sector in Joth countries. 
5.5.2  The  impetus  to obtain "new  technology agreements"  was  weak 
in blue-collar areas,  where  more  traditional bargaining 
methods  were  preferred,  and  strong in white-collar areas. 
The  white  collar unions'  success  in negotiating specific 
"new  technology agreements"  appeared  to be  limited both in 
scale and  content. 
5.5.3  The  technology agreements  and other agreements which 
resulted from  the  introduction of new  technology could be 
characterised as strong on  basic  instrumental matters  (pay, 
grading,  productivity,  bonus etc.),  mixed  in regard to 
ergonomics  (strong on  training and  health and  safety but 
weak  on  humanisation of work  and  job satisfaction)  and  weak 
as rule on  questions of job security and  shorter working 
hours.  Provisions for  'no job loss as  a  result of new 
technology'  did,  even  where  signed,  not appear  to have much 
teeth as  •technological unemployment'  was  difficult to 
define  in a  recessionary climate. 
5.5.4  Work-place  bargaining over new  technology proved difficult 
in a  period of economic  recession.  Prevailing bargaining 
structures in both Britain and  West  Germany  appeared ill-
equipped  to handle  new  technology bargaining.  At  the 
higher levels - company,  industry,  regional  and  national -
the  trade unions  found it extremely difficult to exert any 
influence in regard to new  technology;  whilst at the  lower 
levels - work-place  and  shopfloor - influence could be 
exerted but it was  limited to reacting to already well-
advanced  technological changes. 
5.5.5  At  work-place level trade unions often sought their own 
salvations rather than strict adherence  to national trade 
union and  trade union  federation policy.  This  was 
manifested  in agreements  signed and  unsigned  (practice). 
5.6  Handling  technological  change 
5.6.1  Information technology was  seldom  isolated as a  problem but 
was  viewed  as  one  element in a  changing economic  and 
working  environment.  Even  where  it was  treated as an  issue 
separate  from  others, it was  invariably placed in the 
context of wider organisational factors e.g.  markets, 
competitiveness,  investment,  growth,  efficiency and  job 
prospects.  It was  placed and  handled  in an organisational -65-
context.  Different organisational pressures and 
contingencies affected the way  in which  the subject,  both 
general  and specific,  was  dealt with cf.  experiences in 
banking and  manufacturing. 
5.6.2  The  handling of technological  change  largely affected job 
regulation at the margins.  Neither pay,  hours or jobs -
perhaps surprisingly - appeared as major  issues or problems 
at work-place  level.  The  main  debates were  over work 
reorganisation,  demarcation,  status,  supervision,  training 
and  working conditions.  As  a  consequence  the likelihood of 
new  technology being the sole cause of industrial relations 
conflict would  appear to be  small  (unless a  whole  section 
of the workforce was  to be  eliminated such as in printing 
where  the  above  issues ceased to be relevant). 
5.7  Conflict 
The  studies identified new  technology as a  potential rather than an 
actual cause of conflict.  The  slow take-up  and  piecemeal 
introduction of new  technology undoubtedly facilitates co-operative 
resolution if not the production process itself.  In all areas of 
study the potential for radical change  was  present.  The  pace at 
which  that change is achieved,  if it is fUlly realised,  will effect 
the ease of transition.  At  present alterations to the sum  and 
nature of work  and work  organisation as  a  direct consequence of 
information  technok<>gy  (as  opposed  to government policy and ....-ket 
forces)  are of insufficient size and  pace  to generate substantial 
industrial relations conflict.  The  "infonnation society" is still 
in its infancy and  the  long-term effect on  industrial relations is 
beyond pre4iction.  _  / 
5.8  Trade  union strategies 
5.8.1  Legislation 
The  trade unions  in Britain and  Germany  have  followed 
similar strategies in trying to mitigate the possible 
adverse effects of information technology.  They  have 
placed reliance on  education,  propaganda  (pressure on 
government  and  employers)  and  bargaining.  They  have  sought 
through  the  medium  of new  technology agreements to prevent 
job loss,  control the  inroduction of new  technology and 
distribute its benefits;  particular emphasis  has been 
placed on  shorter working  hours.  The  strategies could not 
be  described as successful either in what  they set out to 
achieve or in the means  by  which  they  hoped  to achieve it. 
In Britain the  recognised failure of the  'bargaining' 
approach has  led not to its abandonment  altogether but to a 
wider  approach.  The  role of government  and  legislation is 
now  central to that approach.  British trade unions,  long-
time  champions  of  •voluntarism'  and  'free collective 
bargaining',  are now  seeking legislative intervention to 
cut overtime,  put limits on  maximum  hours  and  reduce  the 
working week.  This and  other legislative proposals 
conspire to achieve far greater control over job regulation 
through  the  law  than at one  time would  have  been  thought 
possible.  It does  not amount  to a  fully-integrated 
legislative system  as  in West  Germany,  but it is a  long way 
from  'volUntarism•.  If it is anywhere  near achieved 
present distinctions between British  •voluntarism'  and 
German  'legalism'  will be  even less meaningful  than  they 
are  today. 5.8.2 
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Amalgamations 
One  response  to new  technology is to consolidate trade 
union structures.  The  German  system of industrial unionism 
has obvious strengths but is an  unlikely prospect in 
Britain.  Far more  likely,  and  there is evidence of it 
already  (see  IRRR  1981  No.259),  is the spread of trade 
union amlgamations  as  a  direct or partial consequence of 
technological  change  - printing and  banking being cases  in 
point. 
5.9  Future  developments  - participation and  joint control 
B,y  far and  away  the most significant potential  impact of new 
information technology upon  changes  in industrial relations which 
this study points to concerns  the  development of participation and 
joint control.  The  impulse of new  technology is to push  trade 
unions  from  the "adversarial"  and  "voluntaristic" towards  the "co-
operative"  and  "legalistic".  This  does not mean  that British 
trade unions will seek wholesale adoption of the German  system but 
they will seek,  and  are  seeking,  to exercise greater control 
through participation.  There  is a  widespread recognition that the 
British system of industrial relations is poorly equipped to deal 
with  technological  change  and  its attendant social problems. 
British trade unions  see  the way  to tackle  such problems  through 
joint monitoring of technological  change at work-place and  company 
level,  greater rights of disclosure of information and  the 
oportunity for  trade union  involvement and  participation, if 
desired,  at all levels of the  company  up  to  and  including board 
level  (see TUC/LP  1982).  If these  far-reaching changes ever 
materialise,  they will  change  the  face  of British industrial 
relations.  They  will not  turn it into a  carbon-copy German  system 
but they will  develop notions of joint responsibility and  joint 
control which  up  to now  have  been  largely abset from  the British 
system. 
Equally the German  trade unions are moving  in the  same  direction. 
They  are attempting to strengthen the role of works  councils at 
work-place  level  and  put more  teeth into co-determination.  There 
is a  recognition that legal rights require shop-floor strength to 
be  put into effect and  that new  technology presents a  challenge  to 
existing bargaining structures. 
Attempts to seek greater participation and  involvement as  a 
consequence of technological  change  whether  by  voluntary or 
legislative means,  will  succeed  only as  far  as  trade unions, 
employers  and  governments  are prepared to let them.  Tackling the 
problems  for work  and  society arising from  the  social and  economic 
consequences of information technology,  including its challenges 
and  opportunities,  demands  a  tripartite approach.  The  more 
governments,  trade unions  and  employers  pull in different 
directions the more  uncertain the  future  becomes,  both  in regard to 
industrial relations and  for society as  a  whole. ) 
-67-
APPENDIX 
RESEARCH  PROJECT  :  New  Information Technology  and  Industrial Relations 
Semi-structured interview schedule 
The  following provides  an  outline of areas the  interviews will explore. 
Specific questions will  be  pertinent to the  interviewees'  occupation, 
experience,  role,  and  knowledge  of the particular aspects of technology 
and  industrial relations under discussion. 
(1)  The  background  to technological  change 
What  was  it hoped  to achieve? 
(a)  Management  goals 
- reduction of unit costs 
- greater productivity 
- greater efficiency through elimination of duplication etc 
- improved  quality 
- greater range of possible areas of involvement. 
(b)  The  role of technology  in the  industrial process.  Was  it? 
- a  new  departure 
- a  replacement of an  older  form  of technology 
- the refinement of an  existing automated process representing 
a  quantitative change  in  terms of efficiency and 
productivity levels,  rather than  a  qualitative change  in 
terms  of the process of production. 
(c)  Trade  union goals  and attitudes 
- in the past and  today 
- conditions of acceptance 
- perceived benefits 
- positive  and  negative factors. 
(2)  Implementation of technological  change 
How  was  it introduced?  Was  its introduction preceded by  a  process of' 
consultation and  negotiation with  the  workforce  on  the part of 
management?  Was  it the  source of confrontation of any kind?  To  what 
extent did consultation/bargaining revolve  around skill requirements, 
training and retraining needs,  and  to what  extent on  the  implications for 
employment  levels? 
Also  explore:  employment  opportunities 




What  impact has  introduction had  on  employment  levels in terms of'  actual 
numbers  employed,  hours  worked,  down-time  etc? What  effects - if any  -
did the consultations and  negotiations have  on  the way  in which  the new 
technology was  introduced?  Was  a  formal  or  informal agreement reached? -68-
lole of local/national bargaining machinery  and  industrial relations 
Jystem?  Implications of national  agreements  at local and  regional level? 
:3)  Work  organisation,  skills and  training 
~t  impact has  the  technology or organisational change  had on  the 
:omposition of the  workforce  in terms of age,  training,  qualifications, 
>remotion  prospects etc? 
~at impact has it had  on  work  organisation practices and  job 
Jtructuring?  Negotiation and  participation in work  re-organisation and 
job  restructuring. 
~at skills are required for  the  introduction and  efficient use of the 
t:echnology? 
~at is the effect of the  technology on  existing skills?  Negotiating 
ie-skilling,  re-skilling,  up-grading etc. 
~t  is the industry's assessment of training needs  and provision of in-
louse  training? 
~at training and  re-training requirements are  thrown  up  by  the effects 
>f  the  technology.  Can  existing training schemes  cope?  Consultation and 
>articipation in  training programmes. 
~4)  Trade  union  and  management  responses  and  initiatives 
~at general strategies are  being pusued by  management  and  trade unions 
Ln  regard to technological  change? 
rhe  nature of the managerial  bargaining strategy (its aims  and 
>bjectives)  and  the  trade union response  (benefits and safeguards)? 
ro  what  extent are  the  trade unions at na.tional  and  local levels 
!ncouraging,  co-operating with or campaigning against the introduction of 
the  technology or changed  working  practices and  organisation? 
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